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The United States faces a continuing need to conduct interagency operations,
especially between the military and USAID. Surprisingly, however, this field has been
treated much too casually in light of its merits as a potential force multiplier—and as a
source of serious operational problems. US leaders will continue to choose the
interagency approach (over unilateral options) to solve the sorts of complex problems that
demand action and systematic intervention, yet allow room for political maneuver. By
studying the activities of two inherently adversarial bureaucracies (USAID and the
USMILGP) which needed to work together to solve a complex counterinsurgency
problem in El Salvador, I have been able to determine which factors are most important
for unity of effort in future interagency operations. In El Salvador the mission was to
combat insurgents, but the principles and requirements of interagency cooperation apply
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States faces a continuing need to conduct interagency operations,
especially between the military and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). I argue that "purple" is easy compared to the interagency "gold"
approach. To date, this field has been treated much too casually in light of its merits as a
potential force multiplier, and as a source of serious operational problems. Existing
literature conveys the need for viable interagency organizations and processes, but falls
short of supplying the requisite details about how to provide - coordinated, mutually
supportive, and unified cross-agency operations. Using the 1980-1992 counterinsurgency
effort in El Salvador as a case study, my analysis helps fill this gap by examining the key
factors and mechanisms that determined the course and outcome of the war.
My study of this interagency campaign is based on original research of the
interaction between the United States Military Group (USMILGP) and USAID. When
the interagency campaign got underway in El Salvador, chances appeared slim that such
divergent agencies would be able to work together as a team. Counterinsurgency theory
called for a concerted multi-agency effort against the guerrillas; organization theory said
the odds were against interagency cooperation taking place; and civil-military biases
erected even more cultural and philosophical barriers. Yet, despite overwhelming odds, a
very complex problem, and a disjointed US bureaucratic mechanism, unity of effort
notably improved in the latter stages of the war. What were the reasons interagency
coordination improved between the USMILGP and USAID, and can they be generalized
IX
and applied here and now to various other interagency operations—and other dissimilar
agencies?
After examining the extent of interaction and coordination between these two
influential agencies during the war, I argue that Salvadoran operations were initially
impeded by interagency disunity of effort but over time, working relationships developed
among the small numbers of self-motivated, "special" and dedicated people and in turn,
coordination improved. The reasons these dissimilar agencies achieved their goals was
ultimately a function of the senior leadership, trust, shared experiences, and the nature of
the conflict itself.
At the start, the Salvadoran conflict presented itself as a kind of learning-
laboratory for low-intensity conflict—a chance to practice counterinsurgency doctrine.
Preventing the spread of communism called for the artful blending of all the instruments
of US and Salvadoran power, cooperation between various inherently adversarial
bureaucracies, and synergistic civil-military relationships.
In El Salvador the mission was to combat insurgents, but the principles and many
of the tasks required to succeed then and there, apply today and elsewhere in waging the
wars against drugs, terrorism, and other post-Cold War security threats. The required
counter-mechanism for these problems has been termed the interagency process.
The Salvadoran case study supports the argument that senior leadership
intervention is a prerequisite for achieving interagency unity of effort. Another part of
my argument addresses the prerequisites for improved interagency coordination—
a
requirement for unity of effort. It states that trust, stakes, and shared experiences are the
most important determinants of interagency process improvements. Of the three
variables, I found, trust and shared experiences did contribute to good coordination, but
higher or lower stakes did not seem to correlate with better or worse coordination.
Recognizing the resource constraints on people, equipment, and money, I then tried to
correlate the variables of constrained resources and the irregular nature of the conflict
with improvements in interagency support. Surprisingly, I found that resource constraints
did not seem to significantly affect interagency coordination or unity of effort. On the
other hand, the nature of the conflict, as it changed from a military war of attrition to a
broader competition for "hearts and minds," demanded mutual interagency support and
forced the two agencies to work together better.
In conclusion, four of the six independent variables I tested significantly affected
the degree to which interagency unity of effort occurred: senior leadership involvement,
trust, shared experiences, and the nature of the conflict. The remaining two independent
variables make sense intuitively, but further analysis shows weak causal links. Higher
stakes did not noticeably affect interagency coordination, and lower resource constraints
did not influence mutual interagency support.
In light of the inevitability of future interagency operations, I derived four
recommendations from my research: 1 ) Conduct interagency exercises, 2) Invest in the
people who will do them, 2) Educate the leaders, and 4) Develop interagency
organizations.
Finally, the empowerment of interagency entities—the "crabgrass" of
bureaucracy—is essential for implementing national solutions to complicated problems.
Without institutionalizing interagency emphasis, too much unity of effort will be
sacrificed until the workarounds get in place. Organizations need to change to support
xi
interagency operations that, in many cases, are extremely time-critical: counter-terrorism
(CT) responses, for example. Today CT responses are the result of a convoluted ad hoc
process in which success relies upon innate human reactions, given their appreciation of
the urgency of terrorist crises, to squelch interagency squabbles, and get the job done fast.
Ad hoc processes. . . is that what we really want, or rather what we have settled for
instead of making hard decisions and real changes?
xn
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This thesis explores the increasingly vital—though extraordinarily difficult
—
realm of interagency operations. To date, this field has been treated much too casually
in light of its merits as a potential force multiplier and as a source of serious operational
problems. Existing literature conveys the need for viable interagency organizations and
processes, but falls short of supplying the requisite details about how to provide for
coordinated, mutually supportive, and unified cross-agency operations. Using the 1980-
1 992 counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador as a case study, my analysis will help fill
this gap by examining the key factors and mechanisms that determined the course and
outcome of the war.
My study of this interagency campaign is based on original research of the
interaction between the United States Military Group (USMILGP) and the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). When the interagency campaign got
underway in El Salvador, chances appeared slim that such divergent agencies would be
able to work together as a team. Counterinsurgency theory called for a concerted multi-
agency effort against the guerrillas; organization theory said the odds were against
interagency cooperation taking place; and civil-military biases erected even more
cultural and philosophical barriers. Yet, despite overwhelming odds, a very complex
problem and a disjointed US bureaucratic mechanism, unity of effort notably improved
in the latter stages of the war. What were the reasons interagency coordination
improved between the USMILGP and USAID, and can they be generalized and applied
here and now to various other interagency operations—and other dissimilar agencies?
1
After examining the extent of interaction and coordination between these two
influential agencies during the war, I argue that Salvadoran operations were initially
impeded by interagency disunity of effort but over time, working relationships
developed among the small numbers of self-motivated, "special," and dedicated people
and in turn, coordination improved. The reasons these dissimilar agencies achieved
their goals was ultimately a function of the senior leadership, trust, shared experiences,
and the nature of the conflict itself.
In 1 980, the problem faced by US strategists charged with "drawing the line
against communist aggression" 1 in El Salvador was a familiar one—but by no means
simple. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents (12,000
Salvadoran Marxist rebels with alliances in Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua ) garnered
support from a variety of popular rebellious groups with some legitimate grievances.
They constituted a credible threat for the 17,000 poorly trained and equipped Salvadoran
soldiers. Most Salvadorans mistrusted the regime (civilian and military officials)
because they represented an unaccountable, sinister military institution; the omnipotence
of oligarchic domination; and repeated violations of democratic processes. President
Ronald Reagan sent a limited number ofUS soldiers, primarily Army Special Forces
(SF); humanitarian workers; and diplomats to El Salvador to help squelch the rebellion.
The ad hoc team quickly discovered how fractured Salvadoran society really was as they
Secretary of State Alexander Haig first used the phrase "drawing the line" in reference to the mission in
El Salvador while briefing congressional leaders on the State Department's White Paper, Communist
Interference in El Salvador. See William M. LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El
Salvador," Revolution in Central America, ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), 27.
Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of
Reform and the Illusions ofNation Building, (Santa Monica, California: National Defense Research
Institute, 1991), 8.
applied counterinsurgency doctrine, an interagency undertaking under the rubric of
Foreign Internal Defense (FID),
3
to El Salvador's complicated and brutal civil war.4
For a time, the US/Salvadoran interagency counter-guerrilla responses were
plagued by disharmony—why? One explanation addresses the problem of different
personalities and cultures. Retired SF officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Watson argues
that "interagency coordination was very much personality-driven insofar as there was
that natural chasm between people that saw themselves as sort of . . . action-guy, casual
hero (Salvadoran description ofUS Special Forces) and the AID development guys who
deliver the goods and really are concerned with the infrastructure and making programs
work."5 Another explanation alludes to the existence, or lack of, direct senior leader
intervention and emphasis. Tom Hawk, the Director of USAID's Special Assistance
(DIRSA) program, felt that "the only reason (his program) had any clout was (because
of the support they received from) the Ambassador. We had the support ofAID . . . but
colleagues at the time saw us as CIA or counterinsurgency ... we had a lot of criticisms
3
Joint Publication 3-07.1 defines FID as: "Participation by the civilian and military agencies of a
government in any of the active programs taken by another government to protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." This broad definition frames a messy foreign assistance arena
that is a veritable minefield for those responsible for its effective conduct.
4 Schwarz notes that American strategists considered the civil war in El Salvador to be the "ideal testing
ground" in which to demonstrate counterinsurgency doctrine. A.J. Bacevich, et al, American Military
Policy in Small Wars: The Case ofEl Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
Inc., Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), 2. Bacevich expands on the full range
of actions relevant to counterinsurgency. He calls this "military policy," and by that, means the political,
social, economic, psychological, and diplomatic efforts which are used to defeat the insurgent.
5
Author's 16 June 1997 telephone interview with Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Bob
Watson, 1
st
Brigade OPATT, May 1986-July 1987. He characterized the two types as: "The Special
Forces guys were more reckless and more concerned with going where the action was—wherever the
action might be. The AID guys were more programmatic knowing that this was their program and this
was what they needed to get done because they were going to be audited in a little different way. It's a
cultural thing—a bureaucratic cultural thing. But in point of fact, I guess you get to the point where men
and women of good will ... on mission to work together, can certainly do so."
internally. Some of that prejudice existed—and still exists."6 Although eventually
"both organizations became known to each other, " as ex-MILGP Commander Major
General John C. Ellerson observed, interagency coordination "as it applied to the FID
piece, was not initially . . . well developed. That was not because of a conscious
decision on anybody's part not to (cooperate), but I think it was a function of the fact
that we were both decisively engaged with what we perceived to be our own areas of
interest."
7
Counterinsurgency principles demand interagency cooperation in each of the
o
domains of national power in order to win "hearts and minds"; organization theory
explains why cooperation is really hard to get; and civil-military relations literature says
you had better cube the degree of difficulty when such disparate cultures need to hold
hands. To take civil-military prejudices to an extreme—the military is viewed as an
organization which wholesale kills people and breaks things to achieve its ends; and
civilians as the sort who think conducting negotiations and throwing more money at a
problem will keep it off American doorsteps. In fact, interagency operations that are
6
Author's 30 May 1997 telephone interview with Tom Hawk who was the Director of DIRSA, the
controversial—but highly successful by any standards—department of the USAID effort in El Salvador
which succeeded in cutting through the red tape and gave money directly to the mayors. Tom Hawk
started working for USAID in El Salvador in July 1986, charged with the task of coordinating activities in
the conflict areas. Currently he is the Team Leader of the local government project in El Salvador. When
Special Forces officers remember the best—and most cooperative
—
parts of the AID effort in El Salvador,
they cite the activities of Tom Hawk and Debbie Kennedy (Project Development Officer, 1986-1991) and
the Municipios en Action (MEA) program.
7
Author's 30 May 1997 telephone interview with Major General (retired) John C. Ellerson, MILGP
Commander from 1986-1988. General Ellerson also pointed out that coordination was especially good
for a time, he felt, due to the rallying effect following the 1986 earthquake in San Salvador which killed
thousands and literally shook up the "business as usual" mentality.
8 The telling expression "hearts and minds" was coined in Malaya in 1 952 by the British High
Commissioner, General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer. His inspiration was the old Chinese
saying, "Gain the people's heart and also eradicate the fear of Government found in people's minds and
hearts." Richard Srubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1.
time-sensitive, require deliberate planning and execution, and involve the use of deadly
force, are usually performed best by the military. Few civilian organizations have the
resources or efficiencies offered by the military. Military operations require accountable
and engaged leadership, established procedures and chains of command, and heavy
emphasis on training and performance standards. People think that the military views
the world as black or white, while civilians argue about varying shades of gray. Civilian
operations are less rigid in their styles of leadership, regard for inter-changeability, and
command and control requirements. Civil authorities often tolerate more individuality,
disunity, and inefficiencies; all characteristics of a functioning democracy. In a
democracy, civilians necessarily run the show. However, considering the need for
postwar reconciliation, democratic palatability, widespread appeal, and overall
effectiveness; neither the military, nor civilian agencies can succeed without the other.
Moreover, the equation is further complicated in coalition efforts where forces from
each country act in accordance with their own versions of appropriate civil-military
relations. The Salvadoran dilemma called for a cooperative process and multi-agency
response that defied the principles of organizational behavior and customary civil-
military relations.
The problem with interagency initiatives is that there is little incentive for
dissimilar agencies to support each other, especially if cooperation endangers their
organization's status, goals, or other fundamental interests. Organizations are foremost
concerned with their own survival. In interagency operations, turf delineation becomes
less certain and inefficiencies abound as bureaucracies under siege tend to rely on
standard operating procedures, often to the detriment of the larger US effort. The
problem is compounded when organizations attack the problem from distant
perspectives and cultures; one civilian, the other military. Success in El Salvador, to a
large extent, depended on the ability of distinctly separate agencies and their leaders to
blend and engage all elements of national power effectively. In this era of fiscal
constraints there is pressure to do more with less and synchronize resources for
maximum impact. Scholars George Raach and liana Kass emphasize the need for
interagency improvements: "If the United States is to enjoy a measure of order and
stability in the conduct of world affairs, this synergism must be routine, must occur
across the spectrum of relations, and must be applied with vision and conviction."s
Lessons can be drawn from the synergism achieved by the USMILGP and USAID in El
Salvador—two agencies which frequently find themselves working side-by-side in a
variety of situations worldwide.
B. CASE STUDY
In considering the period of concerted US intervention in the Salvadoran conflict
(1980-1992) three stages emerge which emphasize different methods and degrees of
interagency cooperation. For my purposes, interagency cooperation exists when two or
more agencies work together in the pursuit of a common purpose. The first stage is up
to the time of the beginning of The National Campaign Plan (NCP) in 1983; the second
stage includes a four-year period ending roughly in 1987; and the third stage continues
until the 1992 signing of the peace accords. There is an ongoing fourth stage which
deals with the consequences of rebuilding Salvadoran society in the post-war
9 George T. Raach and liana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," Joint Forces Quarterly
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Summer 1995),
environment. While this stage is not explicitly examined herein, I contend that the
bottom-up interagency initiatives and overall conduct of various participants inevitably
influenced the Salvadoran institutions, mindset, and personalities that US agencies
encounter today in their dealings.
Today, interagency teams are upstaging joint teams as the preferred method for
solving crises. Using El Salvador as a benchmark, the interagency approach may be
useful for a variety of other applications to include counter-drug, counter-terror,
democratization, counter-proliferation, and nation-building missions. Interagency
operations can be better described as "collective" operations. As "purple" signifies joint
today, perhaps "gold" will proclaim the paradigm for tomorrow's collective operations.
Besides El Salvador, interagency coordination was crucial to recent US operations in
Panama, Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. In a variety of operations where
the stakes are high, the US can ill-afford to conduct multi-agency operations in an ad-
hoc manner. Is this meant to be an interagency wake-up call for military agencies?
Yes—and it is not the first. 10 Frustrated by the disunity ofUS operations in Vietnam,
President Lyndon B. Johnson directed the formation of an empowered civil-military
organization called the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS). 1
1
Johnson wanted an interagency organization that enabled "a better
10
In the early 1960s, US policy makers complained about the problem of different American agencies
presenting conflicting advice to South Vietnamese officials at various administrative levels. There was no
individual, committee, or task force below the presidential level in charge of the war or pacification. In
1965, Henry Kissinger "reported that there was little integration of the various American programs, that
AID management lines in the field were hopelessly tangled, and that the entire management structure
needed to be overhauled." Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizingfor Pacification Support (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1982), 17.
11
"The organization's title, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support—CORDS
—
combined the names oftwo separate staffs then providing support for pacification: a civilian Office of
Civil Operations and a military Revolutionary Development Support Directorate." Scoville, v.
military program, a better pacification program that includes everything, and a better
peace program."
12 More and more, "Hippies" and "Snake-eaters" will find themselves
working together in multi-agency efforts in the common pursuit ofUS national
objectives. In 1995 Raach and Kass argued: "The interagency process will continue
whether the military plays (leads) or not, however . . . ultimately the Armed Forces must
i o
deal with the flawed results." Hence, the prudent military agency will carry the
interagency torch. The Salvadoran dilemma constitutes a recent interagency enterprise
that merits scrutiny with an eye towards institutionalizing those interagency imperatives
which are bound to improve contemporary interagency operations.
The existing interagency literature, though scant, warns us of the complexities
inherent in interagency operations, but fails to focus on the specific means for getting
the most out of interagency operations. Admiral Paul David Miller, a strong advocate
for the interagency process,
14
calls for more work to be done in the pursuit of better
interagency operations: "To face the challenges of today and tomorrow, the interagency
process must find ways of identifying and engaging the full range of core competencies
available from organizations perhaps not traditionally viewed as participants—including
both the private sector and the armed forces." 1 He calls for improved operating
mechanisms and warns of the "reluctance to address the hard issues . . . lack of common




Raach and Kass, 1 1.
14
The former Commander-in-Chief Admiral Paul David Miller first described the interagency process in
his 1993 book by the same name. Afterwards, there was a flurry of articles about interagency operations,
but nothing substantive until Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II, Interagency Coordination During Joint
Operations came out in Oct 1996.
problem(s) that (could become) the prescription for catastrophic failure (ofUS
policy)."
16
Defense analysts William Mendel and David Bradford predict that:
"Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program
according to different priorities, schedules, and operating areas." 17
C. METHODOLOGY
Finding the interagency literature underdeveloped for my research, I turned to
the writings on counterinsurgency doctrine, organizational theory, and civil-military
relations as the basis for making my argument. I wanted to determine which factors are
most apt to lead to interagency process improvements, thereby becoming critical
prerequisites for success in such operations. I derived six independent variables from
these three well-developed fields of literature (substantiated by a consensus of various
participants of the Salvadoran conflict) which seemed to be particularly important in
determining unity of effort in interagency operations, which is my dependent variable.
These are: senior leadership, trust, stakes, shared experiences, resource constraints, and
the nature of the conflict. The results ofmy analysis are detailed in Chapter IV.
In many ways El Salvador is representative of the kinds of problems the US will
continue to face. Problems in El Salvador and elsewhere around the world are rooted in
class disparity, politically underrepresented masses, economic disparity, and feelings of
hopelessness. Solutions to such complex problems call for interagency responses above
15
Admiral Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process: Engaging America's Full National Security





William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Modelfor Overseas
Operations, McNair Paper 37, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 1995) in Joint
Pub 3-08, Volume I, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Washington D.C., 9 October
1996), 1-3.
and beyond traditional military means. The governing Salvadoran elite had little
incentive to democratize the country and relinquish their power to the poor, landless,
and uneducated peasants. Nonetheless, the interagency team had to convince the
Salvadorans to voluntarily change their ways. The complex FID problem in El Salvador
called for a coherent, timely, and cooperative multi-agency response from the United
States. Preventing the spread of communism entailed the artful blending of all the
instruments ofUS and Salvadoran power, cooperation between various inherently
adversarial bureaucracies, and mutually supportive civil-military relationships.
Outwardly, the FMLN constituted a serious threat to the legitimate Salvadoran regime
and US advisers, but there were other internal pressures to consider within the combined
US-Salvadoran governmental effort. First, counterinsurgency doctrine required
political, economic, social, and military reforms—collaborative initiatives which
exceeded the boundaries of any one agency. Second, organizational theory warned of
the difficulty in attaining recurrent cross-agency cooperation. And third, civil-military
differences posed peculiar hazards for interagency dealings. In El Salvador the mission
was to combat insurgents, but the principles and many of the tasks required to succeed
then and there, apply today and elsewhere in waging the wars against drugs, terror,
anarchy, and other worrisome problems. The solution to these problems has been
termed the interagency process.
Few cases could be more apropos or telling about the complex interagency
problems such US agencies will continue to encounter. USAID, the primary civilian
agency involved with the US military in remedying the many ills of Salvadoran society,
is an agency the military must include in most of its operational strategies. USAID is
10
conducting operations all over the world, even before the military arrives, and they carry
on after the military leaves. Lieutenant General Peter Schoomaker, former Commander
of US Army Special Operations Command, recently argued: "Special operators are in 81
countries today. The problem is not whether we (in SOF) will continue to be called
1 o
upon, but whether we can continue to be up to the challenge." The need for civil-
military cooperation, as was the case in El Salvador, is an imperative that bodes well for
the future.
The "ground truth" about the Salvadoran advisory effort, according to my
Special Forces thesis advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Higgins, 19 has been buried by
volumes of misinformation as the same few sources quote and re-quote each other.
Retired Colonel Emil "Butch" Roper, an Army officer who served in El Salvador said it
best: "Every time I read something about the war in El Sal (sic)—they get it all
wrong!" With this project, I have the unique opportunity to set the record straight on a
variety of timely and pertinent topics. I relied on firsthand interviews of servicemen and
civilians who were directly involved in the Salvadoran counterinsurgency effort to
provide the details in Chapter III that other authors have overlooked. Instead of limiting
my interviews to the senior leaders, I solicited views from all levels. The other big
18 LTG Peter Schoomaker, USASOC Commander, 13 August 1997 audience with SOLIC students
attending the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. General Schoomaker is now the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command.
19
Special Forces officer LTC Kevin Higgins completed two tours as an "advisor" in El Salvador. His
initial OPATT tour was in 1983-84, then again in 1987-88. He is a regional expert. He has made a
distinguished career out of studying and practicing the business of irregular warfare and special
operations. There are very few more credible sources of "ground truth" when it comes to the Salvadoran
counterinsurgency effort.
20
Opinion expressed to author during 13 May 1997 interview in Seaside, California. Special Forces
Colonel Roper held two jobs during the Stage I of the war: 1) Senior OPATT, and 2) Civil Defense
Coordinator.
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attraction to this case study is that it is still ongoing; the war is over, but the postwar
reconciliation is not.
D. FINDINGS
The Salvadoran case study supports the argument that senior leadership
intervention in the form of clear guidance, persistent emphasis, and continual support
from key figures is a prerequisite for achieving interagency unity of effort. I found that
without the ardent support of the Ambassador, MILGP Commander, and the Director of
USAID, the two distinct organizations would have endured an extended period of
disarray as they continued to stay in their respective lanes. From the point of view of
this outside observer, however, getting the senior leadership on board to support
interagency initiatives seemed to be a foregone conclusion given the mounting
frustration bubbling up from the working levels of each agency. Would senior leader
intervention alone been enough to secure unity of effort? Is it the most important
determinant for success? It is hard to say, but probably not.
Another part ofmy argument addresses the prerequisites for improved
interagency coordination—a requirement for unity of effort. It states that trust, stakes,
and shared experiences are the most important determinants of interagency process
improvements. Trust in individuals often translates into trust in the agencies they
represent. People work best with other people whom they know and trust. The more
they work together with positive results, the more confidence they gain in each other,
and the more willing they are to go to greater lengths to maintain their established bonds
and reputations. Shared experiences help build trust and establish working relationships
that serve as foundations for all subsequent interagency initiatives. Track records are
12
important, as are the measures of personal and organizational vested interests. I
hypothesized that levels of trust, with respect to people, first, and organizations, second,
were key determinants of effective interagency coordination.
One ofmy interesting findings is that the variables play differing roles
depending upon the stage of the conflict. I broke the conflict into three stages: Stage I,
the period of the war prior to the development of a national strategy (or NCP) of any
sort, is pre- 1983. Stage II continued until 1987 when the Municipos en Action (MEA)
program kicked in, the FMLN adapted their tactics to concentrate on economic
sabotage, and various peace initiatives arrived on the scene. And finally, Stage III was
the last part of the war, ending in 1992 when the Peace Accords were signed.
Of the three variables, trust and shared experiences did contribute to good
coordination, but higher or lower stakes did not seem to correlate with better or worse
coordination. In Stage II of the war, the stakes went up (as did interagency
coordination) as each agency responded to pressure from Washington, but when the
stakes went down as it became evident that the guerrillas could not win, interagency
coordination did not degenerate. Does this weaken the causal link of stakes versus
interagency coordination? If the stakes had not changed, would coordination still have
improved? It is difficult to say because the stakes were fairly high to begin with. The
stakes probably had to at least be high enough to attract the attention of the senior
leaders and to get the ball rolling. Human nature being what it is, it seems that shared
experiences inevitably led to more trust. The two go hand-in-glove.
Recognizing the resource constraints on people, equipment, and money, I tried to
correlate the variables of constrained resources and the irregular nature of the conflict
13
with improvements in interagency support. Restricting the numbers ofUS advisers,
types and amounts military hardware, and tying financial aid to human rights
improvements complicated the tasks of each organization. It meant that each soon
realized that coordination in the name of mutual interagency support had to take place
before they could meet their individual goals. Congress kept a tight rein on operations
which eventually drove each agency to develop techniques to alleviate shortfalls. Does
more money help or hurt interagency coordination? More money meant more eyes
watching over how it was spent and gave rise to less-flexible bureaucracies. However,
since USAID had most of the money allocated for the counterinsurgency effort, the SF
teams necessarily coordinated with, and solicited support from, different USAID project
managers. The question became not how much money, but where, when, and to whom?
Interagency coordination at the "worker bee" level resulted in the most effective
allocation of funds given the endemic risk of graft, albeit it risky and highly irregular
—
giving cash directly to the rural mayors under the auspices of the MEA program.
Mutual support required regular information-sharing to take place, and it did so in the
vein of constrained resources and irregular warfare.
Of the two variables, the nature of the conflict, as it changed from a military war
of attrition to a broader competition for "hearts and minds", demanded mutual
interagency support. Resources became less constrained during Stage II of the war, yet
mutual interagency support still improved. Then, when the resources were more
constrained again during Stage III, the degree of mutual interagency support was about
the same.
14
Colonel John Waghelstein, the MILGP commander during Stage I of the war,
was frustrated when the number ofUS advisers was set by Congress at the seemingly
nonsensical limit of 55. Later, after all was said and done, he agreed—smaller is better,
in the business of irregular warfare. But then again, is that the American way? In
1979, the plan was to start with 55 trainers, then fill out their ranks as the situation
developed. The proposed larger contingent was 250 personnel, but 55 turned out to be a
non-negotiable number. Presumably 55 seemed only to be an 80 percent solution, but
disunity flourished as more people entered the fray. My research supports Colonel
Waghelstein' s and others' contention that limiting the numbers of personnel involved
produces better results in such conflicts. Smaller turned out to be better in terms of
facilitating the personality-driven interagency projects.
To summarize the results ofmy causal analysis Of the six independent variables:
senior leadership intervention, trust, shared experiences, and the nature of the conflict
—
these four independent variables had profound effects upon USMILGP/USAID unity of
effort in El Salvador. Contrary to subsets ofmy original argument, two of the
independent variables make sense intuitively, but further analysis shows weak causal
links. Higher stakes did not noticeably affect interagency coordination, and lower
resource constraints did not influence mutual interagency support.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
Four recommendations may be derived from my research in light of the
inevitability of future interagency operations: 1) Conduct interagency exercises,
21
John D. Waghelstein, "Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counterinsurgency
Business," Small Wars and Insurgencies ,Vol. 5, (London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, Winter
1994), 361.
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2) Invest in the people who will do them, 2) Educate the leaders, and 4) Develop
interagency organizations.
First, conducting interagency exercises is a good way (a necessary way) to
educate the leaders as well as the practitioners. Operations in Panama, Haiti, and
Somalia—to name only a recent few—all were interagency efforts. It is not enough to
practice joint operations; interagency scenarios are more probable and more difficult.
Realistic multi-agency exercises would encourage combined civil-military courses of
action while providing the shared experiences that develop trust and better
understanding. Senior leaders and operators from all manner of national agencies could
thus be better prepared when real problems arise.
Second, all of the variables examined in this thesis depend upon people to
achieve the elusive condition of interagency unity. Only people demonstrate the
flexibility and finesse required to succeed in interagency operations, but each person
will operate differently. If people matter most, then invest in people. What kind of
people? The doers; the people who personify US policy and protect American interests
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under uncertain and difficult circumstances. Do not just say it—do it! The greatest
weapon a special operator wields is his or her brain. Learning to think about difficult
problems takes education, training, initiative, and practice. Regional expertise is more
than being able to speak a language; it takes experience. Cross-cultural communications
must also be honed in the field. The people involved in interagency efforts must be get
to know the people in the other agencies, develop trust, and shape the deals required for
22
It seems that SOCOM's leadership is about to "do it". On 13 August 1997, before an audience of
SOLIC students attending the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California Lieutenant General
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mission success. They get to know each other by living, training, and working together.
The alienation of civilian agencies from military organizations, and vice versa, is an
outdated custom that the world's preeminent democracy can ill afford. The skillful
blending required to forge effective interagency teams must be proactive and deliberate,
rather than an ad hoc affair. This is the skill required of modern "warrior-diplomats"23
who make up the special operations forces. It is invaluable. It is a bargain, but it is not
cheap.
Third, the leaders who will guide and help forge these interagency teams also
need to be educated. In El Salvador, the US advisers and trainers on the ground (in
harm's way) could not count on trust from their own senior leaders in Washington.
Ambassadors, commanders, directors, or policy makers—every one of these senior
leaders can make a big difference in how the US government conveys, translates, or
implements policy. They need to appreciate (not just pay lip service to) how State
department and defense agencies will act upon their guidance. When US personnel are
jeopardizing their lives in the pursuit of poorly-defined objectives or to solve improperly
diagnosed problems, politics can literally kill. Fewer civilian leaders today have
military experience. Consequently, they may be more apt to view the military,
especially special operators, as reckless, trigger-happy, or otherwise incapable of
handling matters that require diplomacy and tact. Deliberate efforts need to be made to
educate these key senior leaders to develop mutual trust and confidence.
(LTG) Peter Schoomaker, Commanding General, US Army Special Operations (USASOC), stated that
education—as opposed to training—is SOCOM's first priority.
23 Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict
characterizes SOF personnel as "warrior diplomats."
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Fourth, if the interagency approach is best, but complicated by organizational
pressures, then why not create interagency organizations? Policy makers must
institutionalize the interagency process at the highest levels. This is perhaps the easiest
to say, hardest to do, and least likely to happen anytime soon. That said, this is an
imperative. The "joint" train has already left the station. It will take years before the
military begins to really practice what is preached and recorded in joint doctrine. True
jointness has yet to arrive and begin to re-color unified organizations and operations.
Good—because "purple" is no longer the color in vogue. Interagency operations are
here to stay and the organizations need to support them. Without institutionalizing
interagency emphasis, too much unity of effort will be sacrificed until the workarounds
get in place. Organizations need to especially change to support time-critical




The next chapter contains the supporting bodies of theory which help explain the
way distinct civil-military organizations should interact during an interagency effort.
These three pertinent areas of literature include: counterinsurgency doctrine,
organization theory, and civil-military relations theory.
24
Author David Tucker describes the evolution of the US counter-terrorism (CT) organization(s) and
predominately ad hoc interagency response in his book: Skirmishes at the Edge ofEmpire: The United
States and International Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 224. His book
is especially germane to the interagency debate because CT is a high visibility example of the US
choosing an interagency response over tidier unilateral options.
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Chapter III establishes the context for my study by detailing the evolution of The
National Plan. Setting the stage for my analysis, in this chapter I explain how and why
USAID and the USMILGP operated in El Salvador during different stages of the war.
Chapter IV contains my analysis of six key variables to determine their impact
on interagency cooperation and unity of effort. This is where I test my argument. Six
independent variables are analyzed at individual, institutional, and national levels, and
during three different stages of the war to determine the extent of their bearing on
interagency unity of effort. Additionally, some comparisons are made to the
interpretations of policy on the ground in El Salvador versus the directions issued from
Washington. Written plans are also compared to the events they were meant to
coordinate.
Chapter V summarizes the case study results and succinctly delivers the bottom
lines. This is the chapter which explains why what happened—did happen. In that
chapter I also draw some conclusions and suggest what my contributions mean for





There have been many recent interagency operations: El Salvador, Panama,
"y ^ oft
Kuwait, Somalia," Haiti, Bosnia, Korea . . . Interagency operations are inescapable
—
today's modus operandi, but the literature on the interagency process is scant. There
has been very little serious analysis of the practical impediments to interagency
operations and how they can be overcome. Former US Atlantic Command Commander-
in-Chief Admiral Paul David Miller described the interagency concept in his 1 993 paper
called: The Interagency Process: Engaging America 's Full National Security
Capabilities. Robert Murray, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for
Naval Analyses and former Under Secretary of the Navy wrote the foreword to Admiral
Miller's seminal work. Murray said: w'[M]any challenges in our society cut across
traditional boundaries of government institutions; problems often cannot be understood,
nor adequate solutions defined, within a single agency ... the threat to effectual policy
and, especially, effective execution, lies at the boundaries between agencies, where
cohesion is least and bureaucratic conflict greatest." Admiral Miller's work
highlighted the challenges posed during the ad hoc US interagency responses to various
25
According to John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 31 August 1992), 22: 27
separate federal agencies were involved in the planning process for post-Desert Storm operations in
Kuwait due to lessons learned in Panama.
26
"In Somalia alone, there were some 78 private organizations contributing relief support, and assisting
the UN relief in the Rwanda crisis were over 100 relief organizations. Over 350 such organizations are
registered with USAID." 26 Joint Pub 3-08, Volume I, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations
(Washington D.C., 9 October 1996), 11-19.
27
Admiral Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process: Engaging America 's Full National Security





crises and made a convincing argument for developing the interagency process as one of
three distinct policy environments: joint military operations, the interagency process,
and multi-national efforts. Miller acknowledged the need for "an effective means of
tapping the strengths of all the actors in the interagency process." He proposed
organizational structure changes—the formation of interagency actions groups (IAGs)
as a way to improve the interagency operating mechanism, but then he neglected to
point out what critical actions need to take place in the field to ensure success in
difficult interagency operations.
The collection of literature about interagency operations leaves it up to the
reader (and more importantly, the practitioners) to determine and develop causal
determinants of success. To me, this constitutes a significant gap in interagency
literature. Besides Miller's work, there is an excellent historical accounting of the
interagency pacification effort in Vietnam—CORDS, a couple of more recent
interagency papers published by the National Defense University, l and a new two-
volume Joint Publication 3-08 entitled: Interagency Coordination During Joint
Operations. Joint Pub 3-08 outlines the Interagency Process and participants and
explains the evolving role of the US military within the Interagency Process. Though




j0 Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizingfor Pacification Support (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military
History, United States Army, 1982), pp. 83.
31
Margaret Daly Hayes and Radm Gary F. Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of
Peace Operations: Haiti~A Case Study (Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Advanced Concepts,
Technologies, and Information Strategies/Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, 1996), pp. 65. and William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A
Regional Modelfor Overseas Operations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, 1995), pp. 99.
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it still leaves room for this thesis to determine the most important variables for future
interagency operations. The interagency process recognizes that increasingly task-
unifiecT
3
forces are required to conduct a variety of operations in support of other US
government or international agencies needing help. Raach and Kass argue that: "When
working properly, the interagency process determines the national interests at stake,
defines immediate- and long-term objectives, and considers the best ways of achieving
ends with minimal risks."34 Planning a strategic, synergistic interagency response
which necessarily depends upon teamwork, cooperation, and mutual support is only part
of the solution, however. Significant impediments to unity of effort must be recognized,
understood, and overcome if such a response is to be greater than the sum of all its parts.
Mendel and Bradford, in their case study analysis of interagency cooperation explained:
"This is a multi-agency environment, where cooperation is essential, but it is also
defined by competition for recognition and resources." Cooperation—much less
integration of competing efforts—is difficult, but necessary. Personnel within
competing agencies often view cooperation as being counterproductive, even
threatening to their organizational imperatives or allegiances. Joint Pub 3-08, the most
recent publication that could have spelled out interagency imperatives, passes the buck.
It states: "Additionally, there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or
dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and
32
Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II, pp. 95; pp. 273. The first volume contains concepts and guidance;
the second, terms and agencies.
33
1 chose the term, "task-unified forces" to convey the idea that these are dissimilar agencies that are
forced to work together in order to attain common goals or complete cooperative tasks.
j4
George T. Raach and liana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," Joint Forces
Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
Summer 1995), 9.
35 Mendel and Bradford, 5.
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interagency operations. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the
myriad agencies . . . have the capability and tools to work together."36 Taken as a
whole, the interagency literature acknowledges the difficulties inherent in interagency
operations and describes many of the probable pitfalls, but suggests that the answers lie
in improved operating mechanisms rather than personal training and relationships. It
seems to me that the IAGs are founded upon core competencies at the working level and
that is where the emphasis belongs.
Regrettably, this interagency literature is still too underdeveloped for me to
extrapolate useful imperatives from, then test against the case of El Salvador.
Therefore, I derived my argument about why and how interagency operations can
succeed from the opinions of those involved in actual operations in El Salvador.
Lending credence to the opinions ofUSAID officials and military advisers, I also found
three robust fields of literature which help describe and predict the interagency obstacles
faced by USAID and the USMILGP in El Salvador: 1) Counterinsurgency Theory, 2)
Organization Theory, and 3) Civil-Military Relations Theory.
Why did I turn to this literature? Counterinsurgency doctrine maintains that
rarely is killing the guerrillas enough to put down an insurgency—rather it requires a
complex, simultaneous campaign involving political, economic, social, and military
actions. The campaign in El Salvador was directed by the Ambassador through his
Country Team. The Country Team typified the interagency challenge since each of its
members served not only the Ambassador, but also their parent organizations. Next, the
dynamics and pressures involved within and between organizations is detailed in a rich
36
Joint Pub 3-08, 1-4-I-5. Paragraph 4. Continues: "The interagency process is often described as more
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body of organizational literature. Organization theory describes the difficulty in
attaining interagency collaboration, and predicts probable failure. Civil-military
relations was the final body of literature I chose because cross-agency cooperation was
obviously exacerbated because these dissimilar agencies could not help but view the
Salvadoran venture from totally different perspectives: one civilian, the other military. I
turned to these three bodies of literature to ask: In the case ofUSAID and the
USMILGP in El Salvador, what were their probable perspectives and what were the
odds of finding the requisite middle ground in order to carry out US policy?
1. Counterinsurgency Theory
The roots ofUS counterinsurgency doctrine extend back to the turn of the
century when US Army General J. Franklin Bell conducted a counterinsurgency
campaign in the Philippine Islands. His successful campaign engaged all the resources
in every sphere (political, economic, cultural, and military) and empirically developed
the counterinsurgency techniques that would form the basis ofUS low intensity conflict
doctrine. The US Marine Corps published their major doctrinal work, The Small Wars
Manual, in 1940 following their counterinsurgency experiences in Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, and particularly, Nicaragua, during the 1915-1934 period known colloquially
as the "Banana Wars". The authors of The Small Wars Manual emphasized, "The
motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with
art than science while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine."
37
The argument can be made that the origins of counterinsurgency doctrine extend back much farther into
the history of warfare in all its forms. The important point here is that the roots are deep and well-
established.
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Larry E. Cable, Conflict ofMyths: The Development ofAmerican Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the
Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 96.
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social, economic and political development of a people . . . That implies a serious study
of people, their racial, political, religious and mental development."
The doctrine was soon tested and successfully applied in the Philippines during
the 1946-1954 Hukbalahap (or Huk) rebellion. Though most of the learning points
derived from this successful counterinsurgency effort were narrowly tactical in focus,
they did emphasize civil measures over military means, or at least the civic action over
the firelight.
40
Author Larry Cable wrote: "The Philippine experience indicated strongly
that military operations were best limited to a few, discrete roles."
41
The focus of such
discrete roles is also critical. In considering civic projects, one should remember that
the villagers' view of revolution—for all its narrowness and "localness"—must be
incorporated into any counter-revolutionary project if it is to acquire rural support at
all.
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US counterinsurgency doctrine is rooted in a variety of examples from around
the world. Although no two insurgencies were alike, they gave rise to a doctrine which
holds that removing the root causes of an insurgency (social, economic, and political
injustice) requires a closely coordinated civil-military campaign plan. There have been
many counterinsurgency efforts since the Philippines. For the US, however, modern
counterinsurgency doctrine began in Vietnam with the Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. Author Thomas Scoville
brings to light one aspect of the interagency problem in Vietnam: "Until the creation of
39






CORDS in 1967,43 many Americans involved in South Vietnam, depending on their
outlook or on which government agency they worked for, saw pacification as either civil
or military but not as a joint civil-military process." A joint civil-military process was
precisely what CORDS embodied with civilians exercising control over the military
majority.45 "CORDS represented not so much a military takeover of pacification as the
formation of an ad hoc civil-military hybrid," according to Andrew Krepinevich.
CORDS had responsibility for establishing and implementing all plans and operations in
support of pacification, to include advising and training paramilitary units to provide
local security. In the end, despite its progress in the area of pacification, the civil-
military CORDS program was no match for the Army's organizational philosophy
which prioritized military operations that worked against pacification rather than in
support of it.
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There is an ongoing debate about whether the CORDS approach would
have produced better results under different circumstances, or which parts of the
concept were more viable than others. Certainly the irregular civil-military CORDS
approach encountered stiff resistance from the Viet Cong, but its greatest barriers seem
42
This idea is adapted from a similar phrase by James C. Scott in his article, "Revolution is the
Revolution: Peasants and Commissars," Theory and Society (Department of Political Science, Yale
University, 1979), 115.
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"In 1961 President John F. Kennedy made two decisions that perpetuated the lack of centralized control
in South Vietnam. In May of that year, rather than appoint single managers in the field and Washington to
oversee all U.S. operations related to the war in South Vietnam, he reserved responsibility for
coordination and direction to himself, his White House staff, and ad hoc interagency task forces that




"Although at peak strength the military component ofCORDS would outnumber the civilian element by
roughly 6 to 1 (about 6,500 to 1,100), civilians held most of the top positions and exercised a measure of
control greatly disproportionate to their numbers." Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam




"The Army's general view of the role of pacification was characterized by Lieutenant General Ewell,
who said, T had two rules. One is that you would try to get a very close meshing of pacification . . . and
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to have been in the pervasive home-grown impediments to such interagency operations:
bureaucracy, organizational culture, parochialism, turf wars, civil-military competition,
inflexibility, and unrealistic expectations. No agency left Vietnam unscathed. Since the
US did not win, the military blamed the civilians and the civilians followed suit by
pointing fingers of their own. By the end of the ordeal, and for some years to come,
neither entity liked—or trusted—the other very much. Vietnam, by and large, left a bad
taste in the mouths of senior USAID and USMILGP officials. Joint Pub 3-08
acknowledged the interagency disunity that characterized operations in Vietnam: "The
Vietnam conflict was often fraught with inefficiency among the myriad of US
government agencies. Each of these agencies operated independently, without much
interagency coordination, and each was satisfied that its individual interests were being
met. The consequence was a seemingly incoherent war effort." Each agency blamed
the other for failures in the prosecution of the Vietnam campaign; widespread distrust,
skepticism, and externalized blame persisted. In counterinsurgencies the root of the
problem is how best to win the hearts and minds of the populace. The mission is a
multi-agency undertaking.
2. Organization Theory
Before a nation can begin to mount a successful and coherent counterinsurgency
campaign involving multiple agencies in an effort to make orchestrated changes in
several interdependent arenas (economic, political, social, and military) teamwork must
me achieved. Teamwork involves coordination, trust, and mutual support.
military operations. The other rule is the military operations would be given priority in every case." Ibid,
222.
48
Joint Pub 3-08, III-8.
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Organization theory suggests that herein lies the dilemma. Success requires all the
competing agencies to put aside their differences to work together toward a common
good, but organizations (as well as the people within them) see the competition in terms
of the survival of the fittest. Cooperating with a competing agency may require
disruption of the status quo, relinquishing hard-earned turf, or compromising
organizational culture for the sake of intangible returns and greater uncertainty. Job
security and organizational performance are measured, justified, and evaluated based on
mostly short-term egocentric norms, leaving little incentive to cooperate with outside
agencies regardless of political, magnanimous cross-agency rhetoric. Interagency
coordination sounds good and makes sense, but organization theory says that it is a pipe
dream.
Graham T. Allison developed useful conceptual models that help explain the
organizational and political processes.4 Drawing upon organizational behavior theory,
he distills the ideas into analytic frames, or paradigms, which he labels Model II and
Model III. Model II is the Organizational Process Model and Model III he calls the
Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model. The two models, when used together, go
a long way towards explaining why organizations behave the way they do.
Model II, the Organizational Process Model, holds that projects which require
coordination between different programs of several organizations are likely to fail.
Interagency committees are often formed because the problem of coordination is
pervasive, but they are rarely effective because a president, governor, or ambassador
cannot devote attention to more than a handful of such entities and just a few can
29
appreciably alter agency tasks. Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour put it best, I think:
"Interagency committees are the crabgrass in the garden of government."" 3 A
government perceives problems through organizational sensors. Seidman and Gilmour
explain: "Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their
component organizations process information; governments act as these organizations
enact routines."
51
Allison says organizations are no more homogenous than solids (all
parts are not equally flexible) and consequently expand, contract, and react only under
certain conditions. The specific conditions are largely a function of perceptions and
parochial priorities.
Model II highlights the effects of "bounded rationality" in organizational
behavior. Faced with complex problems, organizations will parcel out various pieces of
the problem, thereby fractionating power. "Satisficing" or "good-enough" choices
emerge from the conflicting pressures to maintain the smooth status quo while
satisfying the customers. Avoiding uncertainty overrides the need to develop long-range
strategies so organizations will spend most of their time "stomping out fires" in lieu
of. . . Solutions to irregular problems are often a function of limited organizational
repertoires, inevitably restricting options to off-the-shelf standard operations procedures
(SOPs), established programs, and other solutions bounded by perceptions of
administrative feasibility. For the most part "change is bad" in organizations.
49 Graham T. Allison, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Massachusetts: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1971), 5.
50
Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics, Position, and Power, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 226.
51
Allison, 167. The standard, repetitive and predictive patterns of organizational behavior are what make
this model most powerful.
52
Fractionated power is seen best in large organizations such as the Departments of Defense, State, and
Treasury; the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and others.
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Model III, the Governmental Politics Model, goes a step further than the Model
II analysis by recognizing that the leaders on top of these organizations are not a
monolithic group. The fundamental truths offered by Model III are that the power and
skill of the individual political actors are crucial for understanding a particular
organization's behavior. This model "sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as
players
—
players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-
national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic
objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and
personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice
but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."53 Joint Pub 3-08 emphasizes: "Personal
relationships have dominated interagency operations from Landsdale and Magsaysay in
the Philippines, to Duarte and Pickering, Corr and Woerner in El Salvador. Successful
interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of . . . departments and
agencies to personally work together."54
According to this model, why a decision is made is a function of games and
players, coalitions, bargains, compromises, and state of confusion. Besides individual
choices, the aggregate includes the results of minor games, central games, and foul-ups.
Minor games include administrative deadlines and "wordsmithing" exercises. The
bureaucratic attitude under pressure becomes: "Make a decision—we can change it later
ifwe have to," or "We need to word this directive to leave room for other options down
the road." Central games include the doling out of individual project assignments




Where a player stands on a particular issue depends largely upon where he sits. 55
Allison states: "Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to
believe that the health of their organization is vital to national interest."56 This is the
basis of the argument that an organization's primary function is to ensure it survives.
Foul-ups are choices made because they were not recognized or surfaced too late. The
"mis-es" enter into play—misperception, misexpectation, and miscommunication.
3. Civil-Military Relations Theory
Civil-military relations are also part of the problem in achieving elusive
interagency cooperation. The problem is not the usual concern of theorists—issues of
civilian control of the military or the likelihood of a coup d'etat. My concern is very
different. Diverse cultural perspectives lead to contrary ways of solving problems and
the perceptions that military and civilian agencies have of each other. IfUSAID
consisted of a bunch of hippies, then the USMILGP, dominated by Special Forces, was
populated by bloodthirsty snake-eaters. For each group incredible impediments to
unified operations flourished in their respective cultures, historical track records,
reputations, procedural norms, and inherent distrust of one another.
Problems arise in the areas of civil-military relations when the military is
ordered to accomplish a complicated mission while working for, and with, less efficient,
slower, or otherwise disorganized civilian agencies. "For military officers used to a
defined framework and clear-cut decisionmaking the interagency arena can be especially
frustrating. Unlike the structured coordination of military staffs, membership in the
54
Joint Pub 3-08, 1-8.
55 James Q. Wilson talks about this in his excellent book, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do
and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1989), 68.
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interagency process is not fixed and varies from crisis to crisis," explain Raach and
Kass.
57 They continue, saying: "In the military system position is important, while in
the interagency process personalities are key." Organizational cultures and
philosophies frequently clash as each agency tries to accomplish the mission in its own
way. Regardless of whether the military could accomplish the mission better,
sometimes the civil-military oxymoron becomes the pragmatic hindrance that dictates
sub-optimal institutional relationships. Military organizations are supposedly designed
to rapidly assess problems, make plans to correct and control their environment, then
implement them. Regulations, SOPs, training, professionalism, unity of effort,
command and control, coordination, and other determinants of military success—all
these qualities combine to make the military a force-at-the ready for carrying out policy
actions. The established chains of command are designed for efficiency, speed, and
control.
59 The military is not necessarily the force of choice, yet for want of
alternatives, it is routinely the organization used to rapidly project power throughout the
international arena.
Civil-military relations in El Salvador were complicated by the fact that the US
needed to set the example for a regime that needed to transition from a corrupt,
authoritarian military style of government to a functioning democracy controlled by its
citizenry. "Do as we say—not as we do!" would probably not suffice if squelching the








The external interagency civil-military dilemma was in how to strengthen the
Salvadoran military machine while not exacerbating its status as a largely self-contained
and distinct society and subculture. The Salvadoran military would have to eventually
be subordinated to civilian control and supportive of its citizenry, without allowing the
guerrillas to win.
The internal (or between US agencies) civil-military relations were also dubious.
In 1988, 15 years after the Vietnam war ended, perhaps civil-military friction prevailed
among the Country Team participants attending a festive hail and farewell barbecue.
Lieutenant Colonel Homer Harkins, Army Special Forces Civil Defense Adviser during
Stage III of the war, interpreted a telling incident in San Salvador which for him
conveyed truth in the form of a joke: "Someone accidentally set something on fire—we
were barbecuing or something—and everybody was looking over there and they
dropped it on the ground and stomped on it ... It was an Army guy who started it and a
State department guy who put it out . . . and some State department guy made the
comment: There's the military; they know how to start a fire, but they don't know how
to put it out!" He continued to say, "Sometimes jokes have a grain of truth to them and
I think ... we thought the State department people didn't have a clue as to what was
going on . . . and I think a lot of that came from the Vietnam experience . . .There was a
lot of trust but verify going on."
59 An argument could be easily made that the basic military bureaucracies are very rigid and hierarchical
and as such, not very efficient at all. Nonetheless, the military structures are well known, established, and
organized to accommodate friction in combat.
60 30 May 1997 telephone interview with author.
34
B. SUMMARY
The elaborate counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador called for a unified
effort encompassing all the instruments of national power in an interagency undertaking.
Such an interagency effort would require interagency cooperation as a prerequisite for
achieving unity of effort. Finding the literature on interagency operations woefully
inadequate for deriving testable hypotheses, I analyzed three germane bodies of theory:
counterinsurgency doctrine, organization theory, and civil-military relations.
Theoretical literature reveals that interagency coordination, especially between civilian
and military agencies, is plagued by serious impediments that make it most likely
unachievable and at best, very hard to do.
While counterinsurgency principles dictate requisite interagency cooperation in a
synergistic scheme, organization theory says organizations prioritize their own self-
interests and act in accordance with parochial priorities. Counterinsurgency plans are
necessarily fluid; forever changing in response to irregular, asymmetric guerrilla
strategies. The winning campaign demands initiatives in every sphere—economic,
political, social, and military—and that requires working with multiple, dissimilar
agencies. The key to success is effective interagency coordination and mutual support.
On top of everything else, bipolar civil-military cultures make a hard task harder and
interagency dealings are bound to be complicated by historical distrust and friction.
Organization Theory reveals the complexity of interagency operations from two
perspectives. The organizational process viewpoint holds that interagency committees
are the crabgrass of bureaucracy and those projects which require coordination between
different programs of several agencies will probably fail. Organizations deal with
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complex problems by parceling out pieces of the problem, thereby fractionating power.
By and large, "satisficing" solutions emerge from off-the-shelf responses that avoid
uncertainty in favor of maintaining the status quo—change is bad! The bureaucratic
politics viewpoint sees the organization not as a unitary actor, but rather as a medley of
players who make inconsistent decisions and are influenced by the pulling and hauling
that is politics. Personalities matter from the bureaucratic politics standpoint and unless
they are factored into the interagency process, effective coordination will not happen.
Taken together, these characteristics of organization theory indicate that organizations
foremost look out for themselves and individual personalities can be the most important
and elusive determinants of success or failure. A concerted effort must be made at all
levels to foster trust and mutual support between individual players before they can be
expected to overcome their institutional biases for a greater common good. Nurturing
better relations between these actors seems to be paramount for improved interagency
unity of effort. On the other hand, "[personalities can dominate interagency
deliberations—especially if process management is ineffective—and personal or
organizational agendas may take precedent over larger crisis-related issues."61
61
Raach and Kass, 1 1
.
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III. CASE STUDY: El SALVADOR
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the evolution of The National Plan and
explain how and why USAID and the USMILGP operated in El Salvador during various
stages of the war. Context matters in this chapter because it establishes the facts that
will serve as the basis for my analysis in the next chapter. My focus is on the activities
and procedures which necessitated cross-agency cooperation and coordination. I begin
with a description of each agency and establish their purpose for being. Then I describe
the growth and change of overall US policy which detailed the purposes for US
intervention, thereby driving the plans and programs of each agency. The programs are
introduced as subsets of the ever-changing National Plan. Military and land reform
programs were undertaken, but they entailed little interagency coordination between
USAID and the USMILGP, and therefore will not be discussed. This chapter will cover
those programs that directly involved both agencies: civil defense, infrastructure
development, and civic action. In accordance with counterinsurgency doctrine, each
program aimed at reforming at least one of the four types of national power. In the
process of researching the country of El Salvador and its peoples, I discovered that the
written history varies considerably, painting different versions of "ground truth."
Naturally, these different historical accounts generate contrary conclusions about
success, failure, improvements, efficiencies, progress, motives, and so on. El Salvador
has a long history of Indian and peasant revolts motivated by social and economic
62
Counterinsurgency doctrine calls for reforms in: 1) Military, 2) Economics, 3) Political, and 4) Social.
President Reagan's "4 D's" as described in The Kissinger Commission Report called for: 1) Defense, 2)
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injustices. 63 To understand the extent of the dilemma which faced US policy makers, it
is necessary to probe into the darker chapters of Salvadoran history.
4
Certain factors
described below may influence this thesis more than others, but all contribute to a better
understanding of the environment faced by USAID and USMILGP personnel.
B. THE AGENCIES
The USMILGP served two masters. The MILGP Commander answered to the
Ambassador and to the Commander-in Chief, Southern Command. As the personal
representative of the President of the United States, the Ambassador executes the US
diplomatic mission and controls all in-country US government personnel through his
staff, The Country Team. In country, the Ambassador is the boss. In an ideal Country
Team as envisioned by Joint Pub 3-07.1—free from prejudices, civil-military tensions,
Development, 3) Democracy, and 4) Dialogue. The 4 D's seem like the same ideas, just different
packaging.
63
It became clear at the start that their are relatively few original perspectives about the roots of
revolution and society in El Salvador. Instead, what one finds is a plethora of studies which seem to
reinforce the views of a few and have thus become accepted as "the ground truth." There can be no
getting around the fact that every author (most very convincingly) portrayed El Salvador's problems with
a certain degree of bias. For a synopsis of historical peasant revolutions, read Tommie Sue
Montgomery's book, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution, int. Roman Mayorga Quiroz
(Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1982), Ch 2, 27-53. In Montgomery's Second Edition, Revolution
in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1995), 25, she
details an historical pattern which included exploitation of the labor supply, first the Indians and later the
peasants. I contend that this is true—but only part of the phenomena.
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This is easier said than done because most of these "darker chapters" are unwritten
—
purposely so—by
the earliest repressive governments. A defining period for Salvadoran Indians and peasant consciousness
can be traced to the abortive peasant/Indian uprising of 1932. Heeding the call by communist, Agustin
Farabundo Marti, Indian peasants and campesinos (farmers or farm laborers) launched one of the
bloodiest revolts in the history of Latin America. The causes for the revolt stemmed from antagonism
between the landed gentry and the campesinos, racism in the Sonsanate area among Indian and Ladino
cultures, economic strain during the great depression, bad government, and communist agents who preyed
upon their discontent. On 22 January 1932, upwards of 5,000 machete-wielding Indios went on a
rampage in Western El Salvador, terrorizing, raping and killing coffee growers and their families.
President (dictator), General Maximiliano Hernandez squelched the rebellion within a matter of days.
The result is remembered as the matanza, or massacre. Soldiers detained all registered communists and
anyone carrying a machete, dressed in campesino costume, or with strong Indian features. On that
occasion, between 10,000 and 30,000 men, women, and children were executed indiscriminately and
without trials. An approximation of genocide, the 1932 massacre did not wholly exterminate the Indian
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and various other resident impediments —"(t)here is a close coordinating relationship
between the Ambassador, the . . . agencies, and the combatant commander."66 In El
Salvador, the USMILGP Commander had a small operations staff which oversaw the
various US advisers and trainers spread out across the country to work with their
Salvadoran functionaries. The advisers and trainers included a ten-man medical team,
two dozen national-level advisers, and six three-man Special Forces Operations
Planning and Training Teams (OPATTs).
The USMILGP (Figure 1 below), which outside San Salvador consisted mainly
of the OPATTs, trained and advised the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) composed
of six infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a cavalry regiment, and various other
administrative and support elements. Each ESAF brigade contained two to four military
detachments or battalion-size units. The areas of responsibility for the detachments and
brigades correlated with the departmental boundaries of El Salvador's fourteen political
peoples of El Salvador, but did so to the extent that virtually no Indian culture or identity remained. In the
1980s most of the population are considered campesinos, not Indians.
65 The likely impediments to interagency coordination: 1) Loaded terms (counterinsurgency, guerrillas,
enemy, adviser, trainer, civilian, soldier, combatant, noncombatant, "special", PSYOP, Third World), 2)
History—Vietnam resulted in bad blood between USAID and the military due to the CORDS program, 3)
Organizational and bureaucratic pressures, 4) High-level intervention and congressional oversight, 5)
Unstable organizations, amorphous, temporary duty versus permanently stationed meant high rates of
actor turnover, 6) War environment required a certain amount of "reacting" to the guerrillas, 7) Language
barriers (both English versus Spanish and Military versus USAID), 8) Turf battles; reluctance to share
resources (sometimes even illegal), 9) Lack of planning on the part of one (or both), 10, Lack of strategic
focus, 11) Distrust, 12) Ignorant as to each organization's mission, strategy, values, 13)
Compartmentalization (security issues, selfishness), 14) Career pressures: intra-agency dynamics, 15)
Competing priorities, 16) Physical separation (too few opportunities to interact, get acquainted, bond,
learn), 17) Lack of confidence in one another (no track record), 18) Reluctance to share or relinquish
control, 19) Reassignment learning curve determined level of receptivity to innovation, 20) Parochial
biases, 21) Lack of a sense of ownership throughout effort, 22) Desire to establish routines, 23)
Entrenched procedures due to long war, 24) Easier to do things alone than by committee, 25) Time
constraints (real or perceived), 26) Authoritative, order-giving nature of military, 27) Corruption, 28)
Technological deficiencies, 29) Social relationships (social distractions), 30) Personalities, 31) The press,
32) Prejudices (feelings of superiority), 33) Different "colors" of money, 34) US law, 35) Salvadoran
versus American cultural differences.
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divisions. The senior commander in each department was referred to as the
departmental commander. Ex-MILGP Commander Colonel John Waghelstein
observed: "Due to the ESAF penchant for centralized control, each of the fourteen
departmental headquarters dealt directly with the General Staff (Estado
Mayor)... Operationally, however, the departmental commanders functioned quasi-
independently and came to be called 'the warlords.'"67
The ESAF tradition of "tanda " complicated military-to-military advisory
relations. Among ESAF officers, personal ties and political orientation were more
important than military competence. Each graduating class, or "tanda ", from the
Military Academy was bound to lifelong loyalty to one another. In this system, each
tanda moves up through the ranks together. Officers cover for one another when they
step out of line. RAND analyst Benjamin Schwarz wrote: "Adding to the pernicious
effects of the tanda system is the Salvadoran military's practice of operating not through
a clear chain of command but through a complex system of consensus within and
between tandas. . .The final consequence of the tanda system is that officers are not
held accountable for their actions, no matter how egregious they may be; human rights




See Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Proceduresfor Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
(Washington D.C., 26 June 1996), 11-12.
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Colonel John D. Waghelstein, El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency
(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, January, 1985), 37.
Richard Haggerty, El Salvador: A Country Study, ed Louis Mortimer (Washington D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990), 219. The Officer Corps Dynamics section of the Area Handbook
contains a detailed description of the tanda system.
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Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of
Reform and the Illusions ofNation Building, (Santa Monica, California: National Defense Research
Institute, 1991), 18-19.
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Additional Salvadoran security forces further complicated the picture. In
addition to the large Army, the National Guard, Treasury Policy, and National Police
were employed in internal security roles. According to Waghelstein: "Separate
companies of National Guard and Treasury Police were organized and fought as infantry
alongside Army units. . .This system, designed for peacetime conditions with over a
score of units and functions reporting directly to the Minister of Defense (MOD) and/or
General Staff, was inefficient and unresponsive in a wartime situation."70
The US military force of choice in El Salvador was the 3 rd Battalion, 7th Special
Forces Group out of Panama. Special Forces (SF) had earned praise for their work
throughout Central America in the early 60s. Their regional awareness, cultural bona
fides, personal ties to ESAF, and inherent flexibility made them the most logical pool of
trainers. After the 3-man OPATTs brandished their skills, the war became virtually a
Special Forces "by-invitation-only" affair. The ESAF respected SF. Consequently,
most OPATT officers were hand-picked to ensure they had the maturity and leadership
skills required to operate alone in the countryside for months on end. Outside the
capital, the OPATTs personified US national will and resolve. They were the best
human rights advocates by setting the right examples, day-in and day-out. While
"fighting" a small war in El Salvador may have been detrimental to a conventional US
officer's career, the Salvadoran conflict gave SF plenty of rein to do the things they had
trained for. Given the chance to go back for additional tours, most did. The learning
curves became less threatening during subsequent tours of duty as familiarity allowed




OPATTs were SF. A Marine officer who served from March 1985-July 1986 with the
6
th
Brigade in Usulutan learned the OPATT business the hard way. He said, "The
OPATTs were supposed to be training the ESAF. Marines are less suited for that. SF
guys are trained to be the trainer."
l An important component of SF training is the
business of cross-cultural communications. To effectively train or advise the
Salvadorans, one must appreciate and possess cross-cultural communications skills.
People who understand Salvadorans know that the first order of any business meeting is
to engage in small-talk and to get to know each other first. To begin a meeting or
training session by getting "right to the point" usually results in communicating with an
audience that is not ready to listen. Patience was a virtue for OPATT trainers.
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Author's 19 May 1997 telephone interview with LTC (ret) Jeff Cole. Cole had the added pressure of
gaining acceptance within the SF organization while learning on the job and trying to win over his ESAF
counterparts. He succeeded, returning to El Salvador from May '89-July '91 as the Naval attache.
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"Cross-cultural communication is the process of transmitting facts, ideas or feelings to someone of
different customs, religion, language or social organization..." David E. A. Johnson, "Cross-Cultural
Communication in Coalition Warfare," Special Warfare, (North Carolina: JFK Special Warfare Center
and School, July 1993), 9.
7j SF officers tell many stories about Americans who were unable to deal with Salvadorans because they
tried to "cut to the chase" too early. To hear the advisers tell it, it was not unusual for a Salvadoran
officer to talk for 30 minutes about families, food, or weather during an important strategy meeting before
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Figure 1. United States Military Group (USMILGP), El Salvador
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Since 1961, USAID has responded to the threat of communism by expanding
democracy and free markets while improving the lives of citizens in the developing
world.
74 USAID's twofold purpose is grounded in the belief that it is possible to defend
US national interests while promoting American values. In accordance with USAID
strategies: "USAID conducts its programs under the direction and guidance of the
Secretary of State and attaches the highest priority to coordinating its work with the
needs and objectives of the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador and the
country team, wherever its missions operate." In El Salvador, the Director ofUSAID
worked through an Associate Mission Director for Operations to oversee and direct the
actions of about 200 employees. USAID was divided into a Rural Development Office,
a Planning and Programming Office, an Infrastructure and Regional Development
Office, and an Economics section. However, USAID offices regularly changed titles,
missions, and personnel in response to changes in US foreign policy.
C. OVERALL US POLICY
Since 1980, "the executive branch's justifications for providing military
assistance to El Salvador. . .emphasized two primary objectives: to help El Salvador
defend itself against the insurgency and promote Salvadoran military respect for human
rights and democracy," a USGAO report explained. 76 First of all, the ESAF needed to
be convinced that there was more involved in winning a counterinsurgency effort than
74 From a USAID pamphlet found on the internet entitled: "The Challenges for 1996."
75
See http://www.info.usaid.gov/about/overview.htm, p. 4 of 7.
76 US General Accounting Office, El Salvador: Military Assistance Has Helped Counter but Not
Overcome the Insurgency, Report to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, GAO/NSIAD-9 1-166,
(USGAO, April 1991), 10.
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simply killing guerrillas. They needed to have a campaign plan at least (a National Plan
at best) and they needed to stop abusing the prize that could ensure their eventual
success—the Salvadoran people. The Salvadoran military had long constituted a key
societal ill. Fifty years of military rule in support of the elite oligarchy resulted in a
corrupt, disengaged, repressive, abusive, and otherwise bad institution. 77 The extent of
civil-military conspiracy, corruption, ineptitude and other maladies which caused the
civil war, then hindered its timely resolution, is subject to debate. Nevertheless, most
people mistrusted the regime (government and military officials) because they
represented an unaccountable, sinister military institution; the omnipotence of oligarchic
domination; and repeated instances of underhanded democratic processes.
Prior to 1983 "The Plan" consisted of conducting guerrilla sweeps with
conventionally-oriented, large, multi-battalion operations. The plan was to use military
power to wear down and defeat the enemy. The USMILGP recognized the need for a
national plan along the lines of an internal defense and development (IDAD) program, 79
but they had their hands full with crisis management. They needed help. US
counterinsurgency doctrine dictated reforms and interagency initiatives. Wary of
lessons-learned in Vietnam about the escalatory tendencies ofUS "intervention",
11
There are differing degrees of civil-military distrust in conflict throughout Salvadoran history, but
government and military institutions were indisputably bad. Regarding the allegations of corruption, it is
important that we realize "corrupt" is defined by Salvadoran society. What Americans may consider
egregious corruption may be accepted by Salvadoran society and considered "just the way things work."
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Read Martin Diskin's and Kenneth Sharpe's report: "The Impact of U.S. Policy in El Salvador, 1979-
1985". Policy Papers in International Affairs, Number 27, Institute of International Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1986, pp. 67. for a conspiratorial view of Salvadoran politics and ineptitude.
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Per Joint Pub 3-07.1, Appendix C, the "IDAD strategy is the full range ofmeasures taken by a (host)
nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." The IDAD
strategy is developed by the host nation and "should integrate military and civilian programs into a
coherent, comprehensive effort." The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions (balanced
development, security, neutralization, and mobilization) into an effort to prevent or counter internal
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QA
American policy makers were careful not to commit US forces on a large scale. It was
decided that US intervention would be in the limited, and sometimes conditional, form
Q I
of advisors, training, equipment, and monetary aid. The waging of warfare would be
left to the Salvadorans.
82
At the direction of the Joint Chiefs, General Wallace Nutting sent Brigadier
General Fred Woerner with a team to survey the Salvadoran military and produce a
Of
report outlining a strategy and force structure required to combat the insurgency. His
findings were known as the Woerner Report and became the starting point for
developing a campaign—or national plan. The US had its first strategic document
saying what needed to be done. The hard part was still to come. General Nutting
lamented, "We then had to come to grips with the force development and actions that
Woerner recommended, along with the doctrine and all the functional capabilities, and
sew all the things together in terms of political-military objectives in El Salvador."
According to Bacevich: "The Woerner Report had aimed to create an army that could
threats. Ideally, the US FID effort supports the host nation's IDAD program. That is hard to do when
there is no plan or program.
80 A 55-man limit was set to prevent "gringoizing" the war. This would epitomize the FID concept of
doing more with less. For a discussion of the 55-man limit, see A.J. Bacevich, et al, American Military
Policy in Small Wars: The Case ofEl Salvador (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Pergamon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Washington, D.C., 1988), 5, 22.
81 While some may argue that many of the "conditional restrictions" were in fact, arbitrary, most will
admit that a limited US role was a necessary prerequisite for success.
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Restricting US military advisors from combat operations was easier said than done and may have




Then Brigadier General, 193 rd Brigade Commander, later General Fred Woerner,
CINCUSOUTHCOM, 1987-1989.
85
Per Waghelstein's 1985 Study Project, 36, the survey of ESAF was conducted from 12 Sep-8 Nov
1981.
86
Maxwell G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, preface by Ambassador
Edwin G. Corr (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1988), 222. General Nutting went
on to say, "I don't know whether it was suspicion or reluctance (for whatever reason) on the part of the
U.S. Embassy to allow the military to undertake that effort. When we finally got the Ambassador's
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kill guerrillas; the National Campaign Plan (NCP) was to win." One can see a
different purpose statement emerging. An acrimonious conversation between General
Nutting88 and Ambassador Deane Hinton89 clearly makes the point that there was high-
level confusion about the purported focus ofUS intervention. General Nutting asked,
"Damn it, Mr. Ambassador, what the hell do you think we're here for?" To which
Ambassador Hinton replied, "I'm here to hold on." Then, General Nutting brought to
light the philosophical differences by saying, "I've been told that we're here to win."90
1. Operation Bienestar—The First Plan
An argument can be made that a coherent national plan never really existed
throughout the war.
!
Since no plan existed before the Woerner report, it is hard to
ascertain unity of effort in the beginning of the war. This section reviews the evolution
of the National Plan—by whatever name—and highlights the parts requiring interagency
dealings. The first glimpse of a pacification campaign plan came with Operation
Bienestar (or Operation Wellbeing), a Salvadoran military staff college graduation
exercise conducted in March, 1983 92 Operation Bienestar was the earliest three-year
interagency plan developed by civilian and military advisers who worked closely to
emphasize and coordinate the nonmilitary aspects of the campaign.93 For the first time,





General Wallace H. Nutting was Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command from 1979-1983.
89
Ambassador Deane Hinton was the US Ambassador to El Salvador from 1982-1983.
90 Manwaring and Prisk, 239-240.
91
I disagree—it seems that the NCP existed in one form or another from 1983 on. Whether the plan was
understood and followed is another issue altogether.
92
Another name for this plan was "Maquilishuat".
93
Waghelstein specifically mentions LTC Stevens, the OPATT Commander, and Mr. Leo Rueles from
USAID. They worked with Col Golcher, the Task Force Commander, and Col Amaya, Chief of
CONARA.
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the counterinsurgency effort was guided by a Salvadoran campaign plan. It began with
San Vicente in June, 1983. The military portion was conducted by the newly formed
light "Cazador" (Hunter) , Immediate Reaction (IR) Battalions. They swept out the
guerrillas, then provided security for the civilian developmental efforts. The plan to
provide security called for training up the departmental staff and troops and creating
Civil Defense (CD) forces to provide security after the IR Battalions moved on to sweep
the next areas of priority in Usulutan. According to Waghelstein: "Although the
Department was not totally cleared when this shift occurred in early 1984, many of the
guerrilla bases were destroyed and most of the guerrilla forces had moved out of the
area."
94
Creating and training effective CD units emerged as a weak link. Funding for
the CD units became a problem because CD fell beyond the purview for US security
assistance funds.
95
Operation Bienestar 's four priorities were: (1) Agrarian reform, (2) Increased
employment, (3) Restoration of vital services, and (4) Humanitarian assistance.
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It
focused narrowly on the departments of San Vicente and Usulutan and consisted of four
phases: Planning, Offensive, Development, and Consolidation.97 Though the initial
implementation would move sequentially through each of the four phases, it was
understood that the earlier phases would need to be re-accomplished as guerrillas moved
back into the areas. This would happen when the focus shifted to a neighboring










The thrust of the three-year San Vicente plan targeted 13 municipios
(communities) and covered a range of developmental projects. According to Michael
McClintock: "The initial objective was to clear the guerrillas from the area and so halt
no
the disruption of cotton and sugar production." Waghelstein added: ". . . agricultural
development and production, infrastructure development, local administration, small
and medium entrepreneurial activities, credit for investment, and adult and youth
education. Specific progress in San Vicente included the reopening of 41 schools, 7
cooperative farms, and 1 1 clinics; 30 communities benefited from the vaccination
program; and over 1 000 families left the displaced persons camps and returned to their
homes."5 ' When the IR Battalions moved on to Usulutan, some guerrillas did return
and consequently several USAID projects were not finished until security could be
restored.
Planning, the first phase of the operation, required detailed interagency planning
involving the Ministries of Health, Public Works, Agriculture, Planning and Education,
and the ESAF. The Country Team helped the Government of El Salvador (GOES) and
ESAF come up with various courses of action. This approach was proactive and
methodically concentrated on areas of national priority. No longer was the plan to be
everywhere and do everything for everybody. It made the point that the guerrillas had to
be systematically denied their pool of potential recruits—the populace.
The second phase, Offensive, changed the method of tactical operations. IR
Battalions (the forces with the best training and soldiering skills) were concentrated in
98
Michael McClintock, The American Connection: Volume 1, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El




key areas while holding actions took place elsewhere in the country. This tactical
concentration overwhelmed and repelled the guerrillas from those areas. Additionally,
CD units were formed as a force multiplier. 100 CD units were trained, armed with old
weapons, 101 and provided a radio to call back to the departmental brigade for help.
Unpaid villagers became a paramilitary force, guarding their own villages. Their
families supported them by keeping their eyes and ears open to detect guerrillas in the
area.
The third phase, Development, reestablished villages and encouraged the people
who had earlier fled for their lives to move back. "Big Bang" Civic Actions were
conducted. These were one-day carnival type events featuring: clowns, a Mariachi
Band, free USAID staples, barbers, doctors, dentists, speeches, and PSYOP materials.
The message was that the village would be safe and there would be local government
protection and services. Infrastructure improvements were made, wells drilled, schools
built, and an amnesty program set up to accommodate insurgent defectors.
In the final phase, Consolidation, long-term sustainment became an issue. Once
the guerrillas were cleared out, the work was not finished. Repeated sweeps, CD
recruitment and training, and economic aid had to continue. Institution building and
reforms were necessary to prevent reoccurrence. The press criticized the plan because
the guerrillas would naturally flow back and forth between the different departments to
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The plan for the CD units was to hopefully attain a 10:1 force ratio over the guerrillas.
101 The ESAF worried that the rag-tag CD units would be easily overrun. They argued that the CD
weapons would prove to be nothing more than supplying the guerrillas with weapons caches.
Consequently, the weapons were limited to 50 (at each site) and their calibers did not match those used by
the guerrillas (.30 caliber M-2 carbines versus the insurgents' predominant 5.56 and 7.62 calibers). The
lure to CD weaponry would be minimal.
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avoid the sweeps, and money infusions into the communities were slow. Both problems
could be fixed.
The National Plan was bureaucratically administered through the National
Commission for Reconstruction (CONARA). Waghelstein detailed the relationship
between CONARA and its subordinate agencies: "In order to implement the Plan,
CONARA equivalents had to be energized at the Departmental (CODERA), Municipal
(COMURA) and Canton (COCARA) levels. As with CONARA, these local
organizations contained military, agrarian, health and educational personnel as well as
local elected officials."
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Before long, complaints began claiming that the bureaucratic
friction was extensive and corrupt CONARA officials hurt the process.
2. The 1984 Kissinger Commission Report
In December 1983, President Reagan outlined four principles of American
strategy in El Salvador. He spoke of: "( 1 ) democracy—supporting democracy, reform,
and freedom against dictators of both the left and right; (2) development
—
promoting
economic recovery, social growth, and equality; (3) dialogue—fostering a 'dialogue of
democracy' among competing factions in El Salvador as well as negotiations among
Central American nations; and (4) defense
—
providing 'a security against those who use
violence against democratization, development, and diplomacy.'"
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These "4 D's"
described how America felt about El Salvador. Reagan's speech was soon followed by
the most thorough and enduring policy statement about El Salvador, commonly known
as the Kissinger Commission report. In January, 1984, The National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America issued its report. The Kissinger Commission report
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marked the first time that the threat of an insurgency in the Third World was given the
status of national policy and it advocated the exacting application of counterinsurgency
principles.
104
Besides discussing the military means for defeating the guerrillas, it
"emphasized the political and economic basis of the war and advocated a strategy that
relied heavily on political, social, and economic development as the key to defeating El
Salvador's insurgency," said Schwarz.
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Scholars have categorized the Salvadoran revolution as foremost a "class war."
About 2 percent of the Salvadoran elite owned 60 percent of El Salvador's productive
land in 1981, controlled production, and accounted for one-third of the national
income. 106 Among the elite there were ancestral divisions. The oldest, most prestigious
families were associated with the colonial founding fathers who first exported
agriculture. The earliest two-class society pitted the oligarchic "family of fourteen"
against the indigenous peasants. The elite, owing to their Spanish breeding, long
considered the peasants unworthy of citizenship. 107 The ruling elite controlled the
elections, made few real concessions, and used the security forces and army to abuse the
outliers. Detailing the political unrest, Tommie Sue Montgomery wrote: "Between
December 1932 and November 1979 El Salvador was convulsed six times by the cycle
of consolidation of power by conservatives, growing dissent and repression, a coup











and their assumption of control of the government." The oligarchy ensured that
"democratic" elections produced outcomes that met with their approval. In spite of high
voter turnouts, there were repeated instances of ballot-box stuffing. The peasants were
well aware of the democratic facade, but desperately clung to the belief that elected
officials like Jose Napoleon Duarte and various popular organizations were their best
hope for legal reforms. 109 Some toothless reforms were affected and many well-
educated, competent, and honest people were installed in the government. Before long
however, political reality soon set in and many naive, idealistic individuals resigned in
disgust.
El Salvador is a poor country. It has long endured a boom—then bust
—
economy, primarily because it depended upon single crops. 110 In 1882, communal lands
were abolished by decree, the indigenous peoples were evicted, and popular revolts
ensued. The richest, coffee-growing lands fell into the hands of the "Fourteen
Families." The oligarchy controlled the lands; the landless worked the lands; and the
economy ebbed and flowed in response to the world economy. Relating economics to
politics, Hugh Byrne said: "Ownership of land and production of export crops were the
core of capital accumulation, the jumping-off point for expansion into other sectors of
107
Enrique A. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition (The University ofNC Press, Chapel Hill & London,
1982) 22. Baloyra describes the dealings of "the Family of Fourteen," noting that there are actually more
than 14 families that make up the ruling Oligarchy.
108 Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution, int. Roman Mayorga
Quiroz (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1982), 57.
109 Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratization, Liberalization & Human Rights in the Third World (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1995), 137. Duarte was a career politician.
110 Montgomery, Revolution, 1982, 34. Author describes a cycle which played itself out, over and over:
1) Dramatic discovery of a new crop, 2) Rapid development of the new crop, 3) period of great prosperity
from the export of the crop, 4) dramatic decline or stagnation, 5) economic depression during which a
frantic search for a replacement crop ensued, 6) discovery of a new crop and the beginning of another
cycle.
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the economy, and the basis for control over El Salvador's political system."
111 No land,
no money. No land, no political power.
The objectives detailed in the Kissinger Commission report became the basis for
assessing progress and measuring the success of America's counterinsurgency policy in
El Salvador. Schwarz wrote: "The commission argued that no contradiction existed
between the security interests of a great power and the generous motives of a
democracy; the two were indeed connected." The linking mechanism was to be
"conditionally". Here is where US economic and military aid was tied to reformatory
conditions, including human rights, judicial reforms, elections, rule of law, and
prosecution of past offenders.
3. Unidos Para Reconstuir (UPR)
UPR was a civic-action program started in late 1985 in order to remedy
inefficiencies and corruption ofCONARA. UPR, the new mechanism for supervising
The National Plan, had the same four phases that were demonstrated in 1983, during
Operation Bienestar, except now the operation was administered by the ESAF. It was
resisted by the Salvadoran government precisely because it was dominated by the
military. UPR was implemented in all fourteen departments with the departmental
commanders standing to benefit, instead ofCONARA. Civilians resisted UPR because
they perceived it as another way for the ESAF to rein over the countryside and control
the people. Corruption, real or perceived, hindered the means of administering The





Ibid, 52. Here, Schwarz claims that USAID sided with Duarte, the President, and refused to funnel
their money through the ESAF in support of UPR.
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National Plan. Some argue that the departmental commanders took over the program so
they could be the benefactors of the financial skimming, vice CONARA. "Skimming"
denotes corruption in the eyes of most Americans, but it has long been a necessity and
an accepted way of life in El Salvador. For years, the absence of accountable and
effective institutions and a negligible tax base required the departmental commanders to
fund their operations through creative and controversial means. The oligarchy paid for
protection; military budgets were based upon numbers of soldiers, so force numbers
were padded, and seldom accounted for deceased soldiers; and military equipment or
supplies were sold on the black market. Corruption was bound to pervade in any
program conducted in El Salvador, by Salvadorans. For the US, it was a part of
Salvadoran culture—and a part of the cost of doing business through surrogate agencies.
The real issue was one of Salvadoran civil-military relations, but the various US
agencies were caught in the middle. The campaign plan had merit, however the flawed
institutions and civil-military power struggles began to pull it apart. Civil-military unity
of effort seemed like an elusive and improbable aspiration. Schwarz wrote: "The
Duarte government resisted UPR precisely because the military dominated it. The
Christian Democrats regarded the plan as a thinly veiled effort on the armed forces' part
to eclipse civilian leadership in general and the especially tenuous civilian control over
rural areas in particular."
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The USMILGP supported UPR just as it had Operation Bienestar and USAID
did allocate additional funds for projects in UPR priority areas. Still and all, a




USMILGP, by "charter" was required to take sides with the Salvadoran government and
military against the guerrillas. USAID officials did not significantly change their focus
because the military was now directing the campaign plan versus CONARA. The
USAID perspective stayed focused on aiding Salvadorans, regardless of political
orientation. Though politics were not part of the calculus, distinguishing between
"military" versus "civilian" projects was important. USAID funds, by congressional
mandate, could not be used for military purposes. "In organizational terms, this means
that in an insurgency-wracked country where the military represents the closest thing to
an effective institution, . . . AID is expected to carry on as if neither the war nor the
military existed," wrote A.J. Bacevich. 115 Sometimes they would be able to provide
more or less aid to areas in accordance with UPR priorities, but that was not their
imperative. Security for USAID contractors was a concern—but if they thought they
could work in an area considered "contested" or worse, "guerrilla held", they would.
Their focus was on economic, social, and grass-roots political development. Military
development or enhancement was not their purpose for being, in fact US law prevented
USAID funds from being spent that way. 116
The gray areas of the campaign plan began to emerge. Could USAID funds be
used to ensure protection of bridges, power plants, telephone and power poles, water
treatment facilities, railroads, roads, telephone switching facilities, and other vital
components of Salvadoran infrastructure? As the guerrillas targeted the economic
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Bacevich, 12. Bacevich goes on to say, "All of this philosophizing about popular support and praise
for civic action as a counterinsurgent tactic counts for little when the Congress enjoins American officials
fighting a small war from using the local military to help implement U.S. development programs. . . And
whatever the risks of using the military, failure to find some answer to the development puzzle spells
almost certain doom for the war effort."
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infrastructure in 1985, USAID found themselves funding rebuilds for many of the same
facilities. Without some collaboration with the military on means for improved
security, USAID infrastructure development seemed futile. They needed help and the
OPATT advisers had ideas about how to fortify the most critical bridges, power plants,
and switching facilities. Telephone and power poles were too hard to protect. 117 Ideas
for using snipers to protect the lines were obviously too manpower intensive for
widespread application. But concertina wire, security perimeters, and fences could be
funded by USAID. It made sense to protect the infrastructure for the sake of all
Salvadorans. This was an momentous display of mutual interagency support.
In early 1986 the responsibility for training was turned over to the ESAF. This
allowed the OPATT advisers to concentrate on other things. As they traveled around
their departments, often the only American presence in areas outside San Salvador, they
became the "go-to" guys. Security considerations and restricted means of mobility
generally prevented USAID from checking on their projects that relied upon Salvadoran
contractors. When the municipal mayors asked about projects in their villages, CD units
lacked equipment, or the villagers wanted news about what was happening elsewhere
—
they asked the SF adviser. He would, in turn, make phone calls or radio back to the
MILGP, file reports, or bring these issues up at monthly OPATT meetings in San
Salvador. Following up was difficult though, because OPATT advisers mostly lived
and worked outside the capital.
116 22 US Code §2346 ©, 1982 edition.
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This is not wholly true. LTC (ret) Bob Watson, 1 st Brigade OPATT from May 1986-July 1987,
calculated the cost of replacing frequently sabotaged power poles along a key North-South road in his
area and determined it was more cost effective (based on his calculated savings ratio of $4 to $ 1 ) to use a
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Each organization had its own way of slicing up El Salvador. USAID divided
the country into three zones: West, Central, and East. The OPATT concept was based
on six zones, each ideally allocated a 3-man trainer team. Logically, the Salvadorans
divided the country into 14 zones, or departments. This meant OPATTs were
responsible for up to three different departments, and the USAID worker even more.
The NCP emphasized different things in different areas. The guerrilla-free areas in the
west were able to work out the finer points ofCD doctrine and infrastructure, while
other areas with frequent guerrilla actions lacked a mayor, CD recruits, or even a town
well. Another unexpected glitch in the NCP arose when the villagers who had fled from
the guerrillas to the cities resisted resettlement once the areas were reclaimed from the
FMLN. Plots of land, a well, and a house awaited them in the countryside but after they
became accustomed to urban conveniences, they did not want to leave. Often
campesinos would ride a bus from their city shantytowns to the land they cultivated
during the day, only to return each evening to the city. This undermined the concept of
fostering ownership and commitment to local government throughout the country.
Sometimes USAID representatives would catch rides out to project areas in the military
helicopters. On the occasions when the USAID representative and military action
officers were able to walk around the villages and check on their respective projects
together, orchestrating the implementation of the campaign plan (as it was intended)
became much easier. Coordination degraded when such civil-military interaction
200-man Battalion to guard the power lines. When the battalion guarded the lines, the rate of pole
destruction dropped by 50% the first month, then even more infrequently over the following months.
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"Ideally" because sometimes there were not enough trainers to cover all six military zones. The 55-
man limit, small pool of advisers, sickness, rotations, or other competing priorities—sometimes shorted
the planned OPATT configuration.
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occurred less often. Transportation, competing priorities, and security considerations
kept each component from routinely working together.
4. Municipos en Action (MEA)
In the latter part of 1986, during one of the weekly meetings of the National Plan
Task Force, a bold idea was presented for how to best infuse USAID money into the
needy communities without having to contend with divisive issues of corruption,
bureaucratic inefficiencies, or civil-military power plays. "Why don't we just give the
money to the mayors?" somebody asked. The rudimentary program that emerged was
municipalities in action, or MEA. No longer would USAID fund and build projects that
they believed benefited the villagers, whether it be a well, road, or schoolhouse—the
people would decide. 1
1
The idea behind MEA was that each mayor held an open town
meeting {cabildos abiertos) during which the people could nominate and vote for
projects they wanted. Sometimes it was a well, or a school; other times, a wall around
the graveyard, a church, public wash area, or any other public utility. If the project was
approved (and most were) then the money was provided directly to the mayor so he
could locally contract the required services. Usually the job went to a local "contractor"
known to the villagers. This was an important concept since El Salvador lacked a viable
justice system whereby a town could sue a delinquent or negligent contractor. A
1 90
reputable local-hire ensured more-reliable services rendered. When USAID had
previously let out contracts, but were unable to actively oversee them, projects
119 USAID did still prioritize areas in accordance with the desires ofCONARA, but CONARA was cut
out of the bureaucratic loop.
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In a 30 May 1997 telephone interview, Debbie Kennedy, USAID Project Development Officer from
'86-'91, explained why "nepotism is not viewed as a bad thing in El Salvador." If the justice system does
not work, then it makes sense to do business with people you know.
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repeatedly were paid for, but not completed. Since the villagers voted for their MEA
projects, they felt ownership, and they remained involved. This helped foster
democracy, efficiency, and better institutions at the local levels. The idea was simple,
but not without risks. Cash—$10-15,000, or more—was handed directly to mayors who
possessed little education,
121
nor did their towns have a bank. It was not uncommon for
the mayor to literally keep the money under his mattress until it was time to pay the
1 99
workers. In spite of the odds, MEA suffered from very little fraud. It also allowed
USAID to sidestep the "skim takers". In the earliest trials of MEA, the projects were
massaged by administrators in a deliberate effort to guide each village to "request" five
components:
124
a school, government building, electricity, a telephone, and improve
roads.
123
Realizing that the guerrillas would try to undermine the MEA program, the
first projects coincided with an established CD site. USAID taught the mayors how to
conduct town meetings and gave classes in various aspects of effective governance.
Actors were hired to portray an environment in which the locals could make inputs and
effect meaningful changes. By the time the peace treaty was signed in 1 992, all but
19 of the 262 municipalities had taken part in the MEA program. Why was MEA so
121
During a 30 May 1997 telephone interview with Tom Hawk, the USAID MEA project leader, he
estimated that the average mayor in 1986 possessed only a 3 rd grade education, whereas today, due to




122 USAID boasts a record of never having more than 1% ofMEA funds considered suspect.
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Based on 16 June 1997 telephone interview with LTC (ret) Bob Watson, 1 st Brigade OPATT, May
'86-Jul '87. He said MEA was intended "to stovepipe the money machine and eliminate the skim takers."
It did.
124
Those charged with infrastructure improvements felt all were needed to install and sustain local
governance. 16 June 1997 telephone interview with LTC (ret) Bob Watson, 1 st Brigade OPATT, May
'86-Jul '87.
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Based on 16 June 1997 Watson interview: MEA was first implemented in his area of responsibility,
infusing $65,000 directly into the local community. LTC Watson capitalized on his personal ties with the
Salvadoran governor, DM5 brigade, USAID's Tom Hawk, and others to make sure MEA worked.
126
Based on 2 May 1997 telephone interview with LTC Pagan, USAID SF LNO, Jan '89-Jun'89.
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successful? USAID's Tom Hawk thinks it is "because all the projects were identified,
selected, and implemented by the people."
MEA exemplified interagency mutual support. It burbled up from the working
levels and continues today. It is "widely considered the most effective civic action
program implemented in El Salvador," says Schwarz. 128 The MILGP played a
supporting role to the MEA initiative, advising USAID about what was happening
across the country and keeping ESAF at bay as their control was gradually undermined.
Furthermore, several projects that fell below the USAID funds cutoff line were funded
by the military civic action program. All the military-funded projects came from an
MEA list which considered the UPR and CONARA priorities. From USAID's
1 9Q
perspective, MEA was the "quiet revolution."
Not everyone is (or was) as enamored with MEA as USAID, however.
Benjamin Schwarz notes:
There are, however, strict limits to MEA's success. Since the program is
conceived and financed by the United States, and since its orientation is
specifically local, it establishes little loyalty toward the government and
Armed Forces of El Salvador. Furthermore, as an exhaustive evaluation
of pacification programs in El Salvador concluded, even if the
Salvadoran government manages to present a new face to its population
through an effective civic action program, it will not be easy to overcome
the distrust and cynicism that is the legacy of centuries of neglect and
oppression.
The FMLN also had a hard time sabotaging the MEA program or its projects.
They tried, in the beginning, in the department of Chalatenango, but the villagers
protected their projects with a vengeance. Six months later, by early 1987, the guerrillas
127




made a deliberate effort to leave MEA projects alone. In fact, the FMLN became some
of USAID's best "auditors", as they, too, watched the mayors and contractors. The
guerrillas soon realized that they were not going to convert the townspeople to support
their cause by destroying the projects they voted for and so vehemently supported.
Besides MEA, the civic action projects were still an important component of the
national plan. About four times a week, the military would descend upon a village and
make a concerted effort to win "hearts and minds". The events were well-advertised
and very popular. People walked for miles to attend Civic Action (CA) events.
Guerrillas buried their rifles and walked into town to take advantage of handouts too.
The one or two-day events seemed like carnivals, usually featuring clowns, a mariachi
band and skimpily clad dancers. USAID provided the foodstuffs—usually cooking oil,
four, rice, and other staples. Used clothes and toys were handed out. Meanwhile, the
ESAF officers and the mayor made speeches; barbers gave haircuts, a dentist pulled
teeth and passed out toothbrushes; and doctors saw patients and administered
inoculations. As part of the effort to win over the villagers, PSYOP materials were
passed out. These included tee-shirts, coloring books, pamphlets, and other preprinted
materials. To Americans these events seemed like a flash in the pan, so obviously
superficial, but there was more happening than merely making people feel good. 130
Civic Actions were true interagency ventures. The military provided the
helicopters and trucks. USAID provided the edibles and healthcare. Humanitarian
organizations contributed donated materials from the international community. And
129
Author's telephone interview with Tom Hawk, USAID El Salvador, 3 June, 1997.
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amidst all the commotion, people talked to each other (exchanged information) and
national focus, for a time, was diverted outside the capital. 131 The CA events also
represented an opportunity to publicly recognize CD school graduates and check up on




The National Plan had evolved; from Operation Bienestar to UPR, and then to
MEA. When the Salvadoran government's top-down bureaucracy failed, a bottom-up
local government mechanism emerged and prevailed. Instead of expecting the national
campaign plan to go everywhere and be everything—to everybody, guerrilla contested
areas were systematically targeted. Infrastructure Development, PSYOP, CD, and CA
were all key components of the larger National Plan that USAID and the USMILGP
managed to contribute to in their mutually supportive roles. Neither organization could
fulfill its objectives without deliberate assistance from the other.
In 1984, the guerrillas reached their greatest strength, numbering nearly 13,000
full-time armed combatants. By 1990, their strength had been cut to half that number.
The ESAF, on the other hand, grew from 1 1,000 in the early 1980's to 56,000
uo
"Nevertheless, many analysts argue that the hearts-and-minds campaigns in El Salvador are better
designed to manipulate people's behavior than to change fundamentally the miserable conditions that
perpetuate the war." Schwarz, 55.
ljl
There were formal and informal intelligence gatherers present to assess village sympathies and watch
for guerrillas.
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Per a 2 June 1997 telephone interview with Col Dennis Walko, Civic Action coordinator in El
Salvador from July '87-June '88: The CA projects typically took place near a schoolhouse. During one
event, Col Walko noticed that the new school had no desks. When he asked USAID, they said they had
40,000 school desks in a warehouse, but no way to haul them into the conflictive area. Walko said the
military would truck the desks out to the school, and ran the paper trail to get them released. Bureaucratic
friction ensued until the Ambassador weighed in while the military drove out to the warehouse to pick up
the desks.
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(including security forces) by 1990. By 1990, the US had provided over $1.2 billion in
military assistance and $3 billion in economic aid. US advisors worked with the
Salvadoran forces to determine the spending priorities and acquire the military
equipment, spare parts, training, and equipment they required to better prosecute the
war. Encouraging the ESAF to respect and protect human rights was made harder
because their force grew so rapidly and consisted mostly of young, inexperienced 2-year
conscripts. Assessments differ on progress made in the human rights arena, 134 partly
due to the sporadic reports and deceptive practices of fixing blame, but by the latter
phase of the war the Salvadoran people began to side with the Salvadoran military.
Though the US could only promote respect for human rights through indirect and
limited means, progress was made. The OPATT trainers shadowed their ESAF
counterparts, setting the example for internationally recognized human rights standards
and democratic principles. To exert pressure on the Salvadoran government, the US
periodically "placed restrictions and conditions on its aid, linking the continued
provision of assistance with progress and actions in specific human rights cases," noted
133
United States Government Accounting Office (USGAO), El Salvador: Military Assistance Has Helped
Counter but Not Overcome the Insurgency, Report to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, GAO/NSIAD-
91-166, (USGAO, April 1991), 9. The GAO report breaks out the military assistance into $996 million in
Foreign Military Financing funds and $24 million for the IMET program.
134 A more shocking perspective exists in the 1991 book published by America's Watch, El Salvador's
Decade of Terror: Human Rights since the Assassination ofArchbishop Romero.
135 A March 1990 Gallup opinion poll found that few Salvadorans supported the FMLN. 1991 GAO
Report for Senator Kennedy: "The poll was designed by the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research
and conducted by a Gallup affiliate located in Costa Rica. A nationally representative sample of 1,274
Salvadorans aged 18 and older who lived in 12 regional departments (out of 14) was interviewed in
person.", 16. "The poll found that 70 percent of the respondents had an unfavorable opinion of the
FMLN, and only 1 1 percent had a favorable opinion. Conversely, 72 percent of those polled had a
favorable opinion of the government forces. Furthermore, 55 percent believed the FMLN had most
abused the Salvadoran people and had less respect for human rights than the government forces." With
that said, keep in mind the probable margin for error attributable to fear of retribution for answering the
poll "incorrectly".
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the USGAO. 13 As one experienced OPATT adviser observed: "By the fact that we
were in the brigades, we became the conscience of the Salvadoran army. Toward the
end of the war, Salvadoran officers were saying things about human rights that you
would never have heard at the beginning of the war. They created a human-rights office
in the military to investigate, internally, human-rights abuses and allegations. They had
really come a long way."
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On May 6, 1984, Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte overcame a
tradition of 52 years of military rule to become the first freely-elected president of El
Salvador. That event represented a significant first step in El Salvador's democratic
evolution. Since 1 982, the Salvadoran military provided security for elections which
international observers described as "free and fair."
Civil Defense (CD) proved to be inadequate for two reasons: (1) The
departmental forces often failed to rescue CD units when they came under fire and
radioed for help, and (2) The ESAF lacked funds and trainers required to improve CD.
These became the themes for ongoing challenges: how to infuse funds directly into the
communities to directly support the NCP, and how to compel the departmental forces to
support the CD units. CD was an important component of the plan to foster feelings of
ownership and responsibility among villagers, and a way of life worth protecting.
Despite these shortcomings, the situation in San Vicente had improved. Some would
argue that if the people had in fact felt renewed ownership due to the MEA program,
136 USGAO Kennedy Report, 26.
137 LTC Frank Pedrozo in an interview by Special Warfare magazine, late 1993 or early 1994.
138 USGAO Kennedy Report, 30-3 1 . "A previous commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador
cited the professional and non-partisan conduct of the military at the March 1988 national elections as an
example of the improved cooperation between the government and the armed forces."
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then the CD program would have also noticeably turned around. But CD did not
markedly improve after MEA was introduced. The Salvadoran reluctance to build and
support a viable CD program was made obvious in that irresponsible, unmotivated
soldiers were often appointed as the ESAF Brigade counterpart. CD supplies (boots,
rifles, ammunition clips) were hoarded in warehouses in anticipation of the day when
the US would pull out and leave the Salvadorans to fend for themselves. 140 The head of
each village CD unit was usually a former ESAF NCO who had suffered a disability that
barred him from active duty. He and a few other recruits would man the CD office and
patrol the village. At night, volunteer farmers took over by shifts. CD volunteers were
unpaid and found themselves with a lot of time on their hands. Many took to extorting
protection money from the villagers, others became the town drunks, but some stood up
to the guerrillas as they were trained to do. CD units were occasionally overrun,
weapons taken, and the defenders were killed. In an attempt to make amends to the
families of the deceased CD volunteer(s), a small insurance policy was provided. 1 To
further complicate matters, some villagers accused corrupt Brigade commanders of
skimming off the $1000 insurance settlements instead of providing it to the suffering
families. Sometimes if the CD unit did its job and called for help, and the Brigade
139
Schwarz, 53. "Any change in attitude that civic action engenders will develop very slowly. The failure
so far (1991) to change the population's attitude is reflected in its continued reluctance to form the civil
defense units, which, as one former American military advisor asserts, is 'the one solution that can turn
the reconstruction program around and save the country.'" He gives three main reasons for the failure of
CD: 1) Populace still regarded CD as means of repression versus protection, 2) Salvadoran military didn't
support it, and 3) A catch-22 existed in that if the people would have be willing to form CD units, they
would need to be willing to support the government over the FMLN—therefore the end of the war would
have already been reached (55).
140 LTC (ret) Jeff Cole, 6th Brigade OPATT, discovered a warehouse full of CD equipment while the CD
units were left wanting. The ESAF CD officer knew the equipment was there.
141
The CIA provided a pot of money which allowed $1000 death benefit; payable to the family of the CD
recruit in the event of his death in the performance of his duty.
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responded, the guerrillas would be waiting and ambushed them as they drove down the
lone road to the village.
14
Helicopters became the preferred mode of response, but
helicopters were usually in demand elsewhere. In case the helicopters might be able to
respond, the FMLN prepared themselves for that eventuality. Army Major Ed Reeder
explained: "The overwhelming majority of attacks on CD units happened during times
of limited visibility."
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In the summer of 1987, the Deputy MILGP Commander, LTC Jim Bacille,
convinced the MILGP Commander, Col John Ellerson; USAID Director, Robin Gomez;
and Ambassador Edwin Corr, that a Special Forces (SF) liaison officer (LNO) should be
assigned to USAID. 144 The duties of the SF LNO to USAID centered on improving
interagency coordination.
145 The LNO was assigned to the USAID office which
handled the MEA program. Personalities clicked, relationships developed, and
information was shared. The LNO helped with logistics, threat assessment in areas of
interest, and worked through the OPATTs to provide their USAID counterparts with
better access to military officials. Working relationships improved between USAID and
the MILGP. USAID also gained inroads to the ESAF departmental commanders.
Getting access to the departmental commanders was an important prerequisite for
operating in the rural areas. The ESAF commanders ran their departments like
142
The FMLN also mined the roads.
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Author's interview at NPS, 22 May 1997, with Major Ed Reeder, National CD Adviser in El Salvador,
'88-'89
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Per LTC (ret) Bob Watson, 16 June 1997 telephone interview, he and LTC Bacille came up with the
idea for a SF LNO in USAID but LTC Bacille sold the concept. Selling the idea probably was not very
hard to do, because the use of LNOs was common practice for special operations. LTC Bacille died in El
Salvador in 1987 while flying as a passenger in a helicopter that crashed during a rainstorm.
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Realizing that effective coordination was very much personality driven, the LNO personified a "casual
hero." He shared information and bridged the gap of misperceptions. If the culture of USAID was
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"fiefdoms". The ESAF owned and operated the helicopters which provided the quickest
(and safest) access to the villages, controlled the roads, provided security, and could
generally help, or hinder, most of what USAID was trying to do. The LNO also learned
about USAID. He began to better understand and work within the less-hierarchical
structure of USAID. Other USAID offices took advantage of having easy access to a
MILGP representative and informal coordination crept into the workplace. 146 At the
working level, coordination improved.
Faced with the task of training Salvadoran soldiers while they waged war
against the guerrillas, the US military planned to send more trainers. 147 Congress
wanted to make sure escalation (a la Vietnam) did not occur and restricted the number
of trainers to 55 personnel. The number "55" was not open for debate. Though
workarounds emerged, such as aircrews and certain temporary personnel not counting
towards the 5 5-man limit, the effort stayed very close to 55 throughout.
considered "more programmatic", then the SF culture was viewed as being "reckless". Before long, the
gap disappeared.
146 When USAID had parties, the LNO was invited—who in turn brought MILGP friends. The small
community of Americans grew closer together and networked.
147
The term "trainers" was used throughout the war to de-emphasize the influence and involvement the
American soldiers had upon the ESAF. In reality, they were "advisers" with all the power and influence
that the term implies.
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"When in the late 1970s, Congress asked if the present level of trainers in El Salvador was sufficient to
meet the training requirements, the terminally stupid response was 'yes'. At the time there were 55 or 56
trainers in country operating under a $12 million program. When Security Assistance rose to $85 million,
there was not a soul in Washington willing to revise the number of trainers required to implement the new
level of support. As a result, we were stuck on the non-negotiable number 55 and ordered not to ruminate
on the subject with the press or anyone else." Colonel John D. Waghelstein, "Ruminations of a
Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counterinsurgency Business," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5
(Winter 1994), pp. 360-378: 364.
68
IV. ANALYSIS
Having discussed the US purpose, plan, and programs, it is now possible to test
the variables that I believe were needed to improve and attain interagency unity of
effort. My analysis of the six independent variables (senior leadership intervention,
trust, stakes, shared experiences, resource constraints, and the nature of the conflict) and
the dependent variable (unity of effort), is depicted in Figure 2 found at the end of this
chapter. I have considered each of the independent variables (with the exception of the
nature of the conflict) from three perspectives: the individual, the organization, and the
US national level.
I found that most of the variables play differing roles depending upon the stage
of the conflict. Stage I, the period of the war prior to the development of a National
Campaign Plan of any sort, is pre- 1983. Each of the variables in Stage I of the war was
present in lesser amounts than in Stage II, except for the constrained resources. It took
time for the resources (military personnel, equipment, and financial aid packages) to
begin flowing into El Salvador. In three years the numbers ofESAF personnel nearly
doubled, more helicopters entered the inventory while the number of fixed-wing aircraft
dropped, and the economic and security assistance increased significantly. I consider
the resources still more constrained in Stage I than in Stage II because the ESAF
personnel required basic military training before they could be employed in the field,
people needed to learn how to use and maintain the new equipment, and the aid had to
be converted by the bureaucracy into usable forms
—
goods, services, programs. The
bottom line of the analysis of the variables in Stage I is that unity of effort was low
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because the war was happening faster than most of the people, plans, programs, and
procedures could react.
Stage II of the War started with the writing of the NCP in the Spring of 1983 and
continued until 1987, when MEA kicked in and various peace initiatives entered the
scene. Building up the ESAF to ensure they became a credible warfighting force that
would not lose to the FMLN was still the priority during the first half of Stage II.
Noticeable improvements across the board resulted in significantly improved unity of
effort. With the exception of the "capped" 55 US advisors, more money, personnel, and
equipment were available to help fight the war each year. By 1985, the FMLN had to
change their tactics from relatively large-scale conventional attacks to smaller-unit
actions.
Stage III of the war started in 1987 and continued until the peace accords were
signed in 1992. This stage is difficult to evaluate and separate from the effects of
change in the international environment. The FMLN took advantage of the rebuilding
period after the earthquake and reinvigorated their forces. Early in 1987, the guerrillas
came on strong and seized the initiative, but the ESAF were able to inflict fairly large
numbers of casualties upon the guerrillas. Economic sabotage continued 149 and as the
FMLN saw themselves unable to negate US economic assistance, they resorted to
kidnappings, bombings, assassinations. The FMLN resigned themselves to fighting a
149 Maxwell G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, preface by
Ambassador Edwin G. Corr (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1988), 358. In an
effort to ruin El Salvador's economy and bankrupt the war effort, a captured FMLN document
emphasized the need to "work systematically in the following areas: a. Fuel (pipelines), b. Electricity, c.
Railroads, d. telephone communications (lines and microwave), and e. Cotton and coffee."
70
prolonged war. As the FMLN's tactics got dirtier, the ESAF sought the moral high
ground. The war stagnated.
A. SENIOR LEADERSHIP INTERVENTION
During Stage II, the senior leadership weighed in to provide more guidance at
the Country Team level. The war moved from the crises phase to a consolidation phase.
No longer was it a matter of losing to the FMLN, so attention began to shift towards the
methodical application of the NCP. Debates continued about what would constitute
winning if the emphasis did not belong on killing all the guerrillas. Ambassador Edwin
Corr arrived in 1985 and began preaching human rights, the consolidation of
democracy, the search for peace, the economy, and El Salvador's role in Central
America. His personality clicked with Colonels Steele and Ellerson and they all
increasingly emphasized the bigger picture. Corr, an ex-Marine, was renown for his
constant support and respected for his critical thinking.
General Paul Gorman, USCINCSO, was touted as being the brains behind the
counterinsurgency effort and cited for his "aggressive patrolling." 150 General John
Galvin credited his predecessor for turning the war around saying, "By the time I took
over as CINC USSOUTHCOM, the war had been turned around with a lot of help and
guidance, in my opinion, from Paul Gorman. But it wasn't just Paul. Ambassador
Pickering was a very astute individual, and he was followed by Ed Corr, an equally
good, if not better ambassador." 151 Ellerson' s marching orders from the CINC
i0
16 June 1997 telephone interview with LTC (ret) Bob Watson.
Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An O
Corr (Wahington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1988), 256.
151 ral History, preface by Ambassador
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amounted to an extended "kissss [sic]." "It was—keep it small, keep it simple, keep it
sustainable, keep it Salvadoran."
The most senior leaders in Washington also became involved during Stage II. In
December, 1983, Vice President Bush visited El Salvador and threatened to end aid
unless death squad activities were curbed and certain officers strongly suspected of
human rights violations were relieved. The Kissinger Commission Report came out in
1984 right after President Reagan presented the strategy of the "4-D's".
The senior leadership remained proactive and supportive throughout the latter
stage of the war. They decided to assign an SF officer every six months to be the
military liaison to USAID. This started in the summer of 1987. General Woerner
became the CINC saying, "There is still too much of the military effort, not exclusively,
but still too much. Until there is a better balance between the military and the other
elements of national power, they will not achieve the internal consolidation necessary to
declare peace and make peace prevail." 153 The dirty war being waged by the FMLN
combined with alleged ESAF human rights abuses resulted in tough warnings from
Secretary of State, George Shultz in 1988, and Vice President Dan Quayle in 1989.
B. TRUST
Individuals began trusting each other during Stage II of the war. The same few
characters worked, lived, and socialized together. As USAID' s Debbie Kennedy noted:
"During the late 80 's, most people down there were single and they would see each
other socially."
154






Author's telephone interview with Debbie Kennedy, USAID, 30 May 1997.
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the "snake eaters" no longer seemed to apply in El Salvador. That must have been the
case someplace else. Ad hoc liaisons began to emerge within each organization. In any
case, people certainly became better acquainted with more of the individuals assigned to
other agencies. A cataclysmic event occurred on 10 October, 1986, that forced people
to depend on others whom they may not have associated with otherwise. A devastating
earthquake killed 1000 people in San Salvador and disrupted business-as-usual. "In
seven seconds the earthquake did more damage than seven years of insurgent violence,"
wrote Max Manwaring. 155 Ellerson surmised: "As a result, there was fairly strong
cohesion within the government at that time, just as (one) would expect in the wake of
that tragedy."
156
At the organizational level, the inherent distrust started to subside. While
USAID still felt the need to keep the military at arms distance in order to not jeopardize
their congressional money pot, the historical distrust caused by Vietnam became
increasingly moot. The earthquake also had a profound effect upon the levels of
organizational trust. Watson said: "Interagency dealings got enormously good because
of the earthquake; because the MILGP spent every waking hour with USAID. An
emergency operations center was set up in Ambassador Corr's home and was manned
24 hours-a-day." 157 The NCP also depended upon interagency dealings. USAID had to
depend upon the military to deliver their food, humanitarian aid, and implement their
programs throughout the countryside. Each organization began to appreciate what the
155
Manwaring, 341.
156 A observation made by Colonel John Ellerson, the MILGP Commander in Manwaring' s book: El
Salvador at War, 346.
157
Author's telephone interview with LTC (ret) Bob Watson, 16 June 1997.
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other could contribute to the overall effort, and they all began to expect mutual support.
1 ^8
The two organizations seemed to follow the dictum of "trust, but verify."
Maintaining trust at the national level in Washington was a priority for both
organizations, but perhaps more so for USAID. USAJD's continued congressional
support depended upon receiving high marks from the auditors. Without money,
USAID was impotent. Overall, trust improved and the congressional allocations
increased. In response to the huge amount of misinformation that dominated the press,
the embassy sent out widely circulated daily reports so the national leadership could
read the unadulterated story. Much time was devoted towards bolstering national trust
in hopes of preserving national will. The FMLN also knew the importance ofUS
national will to the prolonged counterinsurgency effort. According to a classified report
about PSYOP in El Salvador, the FMLN waged a sophisticated PSYOP campaign of
their own inside the Washington beltway:
The FMLN's PSYOP-related activities were highly effective, precisely
because insurgent strategists—especially after the failed rebel offensive
of 1981—did not draw arbitrary lines between political and military
endeavors. Likewise, the FMLN categorized the activities of . . . USAID
and all the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) as
"political work", counterinsurgency, or psychological warfare—labels
that horrified officials of those agencies.
159
Despite the efforts ofUSAID and the MILGP, national trust was deliberately
attacked and undermined by the FMLN.
During Stage III, the LNO made a difference, raising "worker bee" trust to its
highest level of the entire war. It was during this period that the loaded terms (i.e.,
158 The concept of "trust, but verify" belongs to ex-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
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counter-insurgency, PSYOP, and Special Forces) lost their mystique and negative
connotations. Working together each day for 6 months created bonds of friendship and
trust that continue still to this day. USAID and MILGP representatives planned together
for the war's end. Said Major General Mark Hamilton, "Peace was a subject matter
conducive to mutual discourse."
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C. STAKES
Individual stakes went up in conjunction with the increased emphasis
from senior leaders. The Ambassador was vigorously pressing interagency
coordination and the FMLN began to change to small-scale tactics and economic
sabotage. USAID workers came to the OPATTs and asked for their help in
securing infrastructure projects from guerrilla saboteurs. The military civic
action program depended upon USAID foodstuffs to draw the crowds. Nobody
wanted their part of the interdependent NCP to be the weak link that lost the
war. USAID depended upon the military for security information and
protection. As the FMLN turned to antipersonnel mines, bombings,
kidnappings, and other "random" acts of violence, the stakes were raised for
everyone in El Salvador.
The US had stated its purpose and formulated a plan. Each organization knew
its reputation, and status hinged on the professional integration of their respective
programs. Their successes would do much to heal the wounds left by their parent
institutions in Vietnam. If they failed to "draw the line" in El Salvador and prevent the
159 SECRET NOFORN Document, S272479, A History ofPsychological Operations in El Salvador:
lessons Learned and Prospectsfor the Future (U), 2.
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spread of communism, the war would escalate and others would enter the fray. Each
organization knew the best chances for success would result from keeping the operation
small. The MILGP wanted to stay with the SF approach and the El Salvador mission
controlled a growing pot of money, second only to the USAID program in Egypt.
The US national stakes were raised as the counterinsurgency effort took on the
task of nation building. The 1 984 Kissinger Commission report "educated Americans
about the stakes in Central America and helped regularize subsequent congressional
funding of the Salvadoran war effort," wrote Bacevich.
161
In Stage II of the war, the
US shifted its objectives to creating a democracy, respect for human rights, and the
possible returns to US enterprises by building better institutions in El Salvador.
As the war became unwinnable for the FMLN during Stage III, the stakes
lessened. Peace seemed inevitable—it was only a question of when. The Salvadoran
people grew tired of the war and just wanted it to end. Democracy had grabbed a
foothold; the FMLN showed signs of desperation; the Berlin wall came down; and the
Soviet Union abandoned its surrogates. Communism was a defeated ideology. The
stakes became different shades of democracy, the extent to which institutions could be
reformed, and how far the US should go to enforce human rights. In Washington, what
happened in El Salvador was of little consequence in light of the dramatic changes
across the globe. The US had won the Cold War.
160 MG Mark Hamilton, MILGP Commander, Sep '90-Sep '92, during 13 June 1997 telephone interview
with author.
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A.J. Bacevich, et al, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case ofEl Salvador (Institute for




The NCP demanded more "shared" experiences on the ground. The OPATTs
worked with the USAID infrastructure development officers to win the "hearts and
minds" as prescribed by the NCP. The "go-to-guys" learned who to call when the
answers to villagers' questions fell beyond their expertise. More money in USAID
meant more workers to control and track its distribution. Interagency "hooks" emerged
where they had not previously existed. In instituting a plan that was very much
personality-driven, interagency "hooks" proved to be very useful. Representatives from
each organization worked together to sponsor the civic action programs, ensure fair and
unhindered national elections, and began to realize that they each contributed to a larger
strategy. The earthquake was an experience shared by all. Workplaces were destroyed,
people were injured, unaccounted for, and suddenly people found themselves working
side-by-side.
Both organizations had seen significant progress since the Operation Bienestar
campaign started in San Vicente. In the Embassy's "100 day" report, progress was
recorded: "One hundred days after its launching, the Salvadoran National Campaign
Plan for the Department of San Vicente has achieved or exceeded substantially all of its
objectives. Attention is increasingly being focused on Usulutan where the approach to
date has been less systematic and less successful." 163 Stage II was a period of
momentum for both organizations. The military road the waves of success with
Operation Phoenix which was designed to deny the guerrillas the high ground by driving
162
In a 16 June 1997 telephone interview, LTC (ret) Bob Watson stated that bit of fate that made a big
difference for him was that Greg Huber who ran the USAID Private Enterprise portion was his classmate
from the Georgetown class of '68.
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them from strongholds on the Guazapa Volcano. Human rights became a real concern
to the ESAF—which had become more proficient and self-sufficient.
The US government was keenly interested in the Salvadoran conflict. A lot of
aid was being pumped into a very small country and everybody demanded to know how
it was being spent. The FMLN lobby stirred up national debates, war refugees poured
into the US, and the press brought to light "all of the warts" (real, or perceived).
Congressmen and congressional staffers, Human Rights activists, Ambassadors,
Presidential Envoys, and others made the Salvadoran experiences
—
shared.
Both organizations had forged fairly good interagency working relationships by
the latter stage of the war. The NCP required interagency dealings; the senior leadership
reinforced the need for such projects; and both organizations better understood the
contributions of the other. With an eye towards preparing El Salvador to carry on in a
post-war environment, the same people turned to new challenges. The Country Team
meetings that took place six times-a-week during the war became fewer and less regular.
The organizations worked together well—but no longer, extensively. The military once
again began to be kept at arms length as civilians debated how to demobilize
combatants and assimilate them into a democratic society.
E. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
From day one, anybody who performed duties in El Salvador knew they were
necessarily restrained. The 55-man cap meant each person would have to be wear many
different hats. Those who remembered Vietnam knew that if it were not for the US
personnel limits, many Americans would be inclined to take charge of any situation that
163 US Embassy State Department Message 042142Z, October 4, 1983.
78
tripped up the ESAF, then try to run the war for themselves. The small US contingent
could not take over; they were relegated to the sidelines. Everybody became a human
rights activist. The different colors ofmoney meant USAID and USMILGP officers had
to be creative, liberal, or even deceptive if they wanted to get their missions done in a
timely manner. An OPATT adviser would have to be an expert scrounger, remembering
to pick up a fan belt for his truck during a trip to town for a meeting, or swapping a
uniform item for some help down the line. A CD coordinator might have money for
guns, but no money for replacement parts. There was no staff to "make things happen".
It was up to that lone adviser to survive by his wits. One phone, one radio, one road;
one of anything was usually considered as being ahead of the game. The helicopters,
which turned out to be the best way of getting around the country, belonged to the
ESAF. Realizing that there were limits on equipment, money, and personnel, meant that
everyone soon learned to accept workarounds—or else, did without.
Considered as a whole, the organizations were less constrained than the
individuals themselves. The MILGP could get lots of support, equipment, and money,
and satellite imagery that showed enemy activity, but then the ESAF had to be
convinced to use it against the FMLN. The standing restraint was that it was to be a
Salvadoran effort. USAID was forced to work with, and through, corrupt Salvadoran
institutions. USAID and the US military had to take the heat when their Salvadoran
counterparts got out of hand. Many concessions had to made in the interest of achieving
larger goals. USAID understood that Congress would withhold aid as necessary to
encourage Salvadoran reforms. The on-again, off-again aid pipeline hindered USAID 's
programs that depended so heavily upon the regularity of programmed funds.
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Keeping the effort Salvadoran, thus preventing the US from being drawn into a
"Vietnam-like" quagmire, was the rationale behind the US policy makers not simply
signing a blank check on the US treasury. Instead, over a $1 .5 billion was spent during
Stage II of the war. The US national resources, other than military personnel in-country,
were only limited by national will. If more money or equipment would have ensured
defeat of the FMLN, it would have been so allocated. The problem was that more
money and equipment was not the answer. Success in El Salvador would require, time,
patience, and perseverance
—
precious commodities for Americans. During Stage II, the
US started talking about long-range strategies and seemed to be getting settled in for the
long haul.
As the war quieted down, many of the familiar bureaucratic resource constraints
resurfaced. The military aid dried up and USAID money still could not be used to fund
military projects. An important question which pertained to the large Salvadoran
military that was to be retrained and assimilated into the civilian sector was, "When is a
military person no longer military?"
164 The answer turned out to be: "When they enter
the transition program," but the requirement to distinguish between ex-FMLN versus
ex-soldiers proved troublesome.
F. NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The National Campaign Plan formalized the requirement for initiatives much
broader than military action. It became obvious that it would not be enough to just build
an ESAF capability to go out and kill guerrillas. The effort began to take on the
164 MG Mark Hamilton, MILGP Commander, Sep '90-Sep '92, during 13 June 1997 telephone interview.
"USAID at the highest levels had a real anti-military bend. The rules were written to specifically support
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appearance of nation building. The ESAF had developed the capability to hold their
own militarily, developed plans for sustained operations, and adjusted their efforts to
counter the FMLN's deliberate war on the economy. 165 In 1985, the FMLN changed
tactics from large conventional attacks to small-scale operations. Economic sabotage
increased—and the Country Team realized it was time to switch towards an interagency
approach. The changing nature of the war demanded (and allowed for) a broader
interagency approach to the war. 166
A senior MILGP officer commented: "While in El Sal [sic], I became impressed
by the desire of the younger USAID and USMILGP folks to win the war. If we really
did win, I'm convinced it was a direct result of their work and willingness to make
things happen, in spite of faulty programs and interagency coordination in Washington."
Stage III saw the war change its complexion. The FMLN's tactics were "talk,
talk—fight, fight," while continuing their efforts to bleed the country dry by attacking
the economic infrastructure. The MEA plan continued to encourage the growth of
grass roots government. The war became more political than ever before. ESAF
soldiers felt betrayed as concessions were made to the FMLN in the name of peace.
non-soldiers. I agree with the intent of the regulation, but..." (Author's note: The result translated into a
transition program that favored the ex-guerrillas over the ex-soldiers).
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Col John D. Waghelstein emphasized the importance of getting the diagnosis right before prescribing
the treatment in his article, "Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counterinsurgency
Business," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5 (Winter 1994) pp. 360-378: 369. He noted: "...(I)t
became obvious that the guerrilla campaign was not targeted against the ESAF and its installations but
against the economy and specifically against the two departments."
166 MG Mark Hamilton made the point in a 13 June 1997 telephone interview that the biggest hindrance to
interagency unity of effort was in not "knowing when it was time to switch" (from a military dominant
approach to a broader strategy).
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G. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INTERAGENCY UNITY OF EFFORT
Unity of effort was not perfect by the end of the war, but it was obviously much
improved. Without a relatively high level of unity, the MILGP and USAID would not
have been able to systematically win over 70 percent of the Salvadoran "hearts and
minds" as illustrated by the 1990 Gallup opinion poll. An argument can be made that
the FMLN became their own worst enemy by waging a brutal and dirty war towards the
end, but their actions can be attributed to big losses in the political, military, economic,
and social arenas. USAID and the MILGP worked together to undermine the FMLN
platform in each of these areas by executing their respective portions of the NCP. A
budding democracy offered the people an opportunity make changes through nonviolent
means; defense reforms paid off as the ESAF became a more professional and capable
institution, and the economic infrastructure improved the quality of life of simple
villagers. Unity of effort improved despite the overwhelming hindrances—how?
It seems that unity of effort could not have improved had it not been for better
interagency coordination and mutual support, but it is not clear that more of each would
have necessarily led to more unity of effort. The different programs required by the
NCP could not be have been implemented by either agency alone. Whenever USAID
personnel ventured out from the capital to rebuild infrastructure, distribute food, or
encourage local governments, they learned the prudence of coordinating their activities
with the MILGP. The Ambassadors and MILGP Commanders encouraged interagency
coordination. MILGP and USAID efforts combined to produce a synergistic effect.
The military benefited by sharing the humanitarian limelight with USAID; and USAID
benefited from the MILGP' s knowledge of the threat, ties to the ESAF fiefdoms
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throughout the country, as well as their mobility and logistics capabilities. USAID had
money to spend on infrastructure development; the MILGP helped protect those
investments. They trained and established CD units, improved the security perimeters
of important infrastructure sites, and worked with the ESAF to enhance USAID' s efforts
in the countryside. One of the most difficult tasks was to provide security for the light
poles. Realizing this, USAID contracted a repair team that developed an awesome
capability to fly replacement power poles out to wherever the guerrillas blew up or
chopped down power poles. Hence, the insurgents were rarely able to deny electrical
power for more than a couple of hours on any given day. Keeping the lights on had a
therapeutic effect and increased the efficiency of all kinds of civilian and military
operations.
Later, as the two organizations worked to prepare for peace, civil-military
tensions reemerged. The MILGP and USAID still worked together, but their goals
began to clash. Most of the problems centered around the issue ofhow to reintegrate
the combatants into the civilian sector. In the end, USAID favored the former guerrillas
at the expense of the ex-soldiers.
H. SUMMARY
In conclusion, four of the six independent variables I tested significantly affected
the degree to which interagency unity of effort occurred: senior leadership involvement,
trust, shared experiences, and the nature of the conflict. The remaining two independent
variables make sense intuitively, but further analysis shows weak causal links. Higher
stakes did not noticeably affect interagency coordination, and lower resource constraints












Country Team L H H Stage II or III
CINC* L M M+ Stage III
National M H H Stage II or III
Trust
Individuals* L M H Stage III
Organizational L M M Stage II or III
National L M M Stage II or III
Stakes
Individual* M H M Stage II
Organizational * M H M Stage II
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Shared Experiences
Individual L H H Stage II or III
Organizational * L M H Stage III
National M H H Stage II or III
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Personal M M M Stage I, II or III
Organizational * M L M Stage I or III
National* M L M Stage I or III
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Figure 2. Analysis of Variables
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V. RESULTS
At the start, the Salvadoran conflict presented itself as a kind of learning-
laboratory for low-intensity conflict—a chance to practice counterinsurgency doctrine.
The complex FID problem in El Salvador called for a coherent, timely, and cooperative
multi-agency response from the United States. Preventing the spread of communism
entailed the artful blending of all the instruments ofUS and Salvadoran power,
cooperation between various inherently adversarial bureaucracies, and synergistic civil-
military relationships. Outwardly, the FMLN constituted a serious external threat to the
legitimate Salvadoran regime and US advisers, but there were other internal pressures to
consider within the combined US-Salvadoran governmental response. First,
counterinsurgency doctrine required political, economic, social, and military reforms
—
collaborative initiatives which exceeded the boundaries of any one agency. Second,
organizational theory warned of the difficulty in attaining recurrent cross-agency
cooperation. And third, civil-military differences posed peculiar hazards for interagency
dealings. In El Salvador the mission was to combat insurgents, but the principles and
many of the tasks required to succeed then and there, apply today and elsewhere in
waging the wars against drugs, terror, anarchy, and other worrisome problems. The
required counter-mechanism for these problems has been termed the interagency
process.
1 7
Lessons emerged from the interagency operations in El Salvador that surely
167
The literature is scant on the interagency process but former US Atlantic Command Commander-in
Chief Admiral Paul David Miller first described the concept in his book, The Interagency Process,
National Security paper 1 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993).
Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Washington D.C.,
9 October 1996) outlines the Interagency Process and participants and explains the evolving role of the
US military within the Interagency Process. Joint Pub 3-08 reaffirms the importance of interagency
coordination and unity of effort but leaves room for this thesis to focus the people tasked with such
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apply to the most predominant form of conflict that the US will encounter more and
more each day.
The overarching question posed at the start of this study was: What were the
reasons US interagency coordination and unity of effort improved in El Salvador during
the war, and can they be generalized and applied to contemporary interagency
operations? Three hypotheses were tested in Chapter IV in an attempt to isolate some
key variables that can be considered, developed, and applied to other interagency
efforts. Moreover, in the interest of avoiding interagency disunity of effort, limiting the
numbers of personnel involved on the ground in El Salvador turned out to be a good
thing. To reiterate Colonel Waghelstein's finding: smaller is better.
A. HYPOTHESIS #1
Clear guidance, persistent emphasis, and continual supportfrom key senior
leaders are necessary prerequisitesfor achieving extended interagency unity ofeffort.
This hypothesis proved to be true in the case of El Salvador. In spite of some
spectacular feats by a group of very talented, well-intentioned, special operators and
USAID field agents, interagency unity of effort was dismal until after a deliberate effort
was made by the senior leadership to articulate a purpose, plan, and programs required
to counter the insurgents' gains. Politics sometimes force decision makers to settle
for sub-optimal solutions and that seems to have been the case during the first few years
of the war. The situation was so strange, and the government that we supported was so
operations on those variables which seem to be most instrumental in achieving the vital links required to
succeed.
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This early period of the war is chronicled as a period of disarray, but I want to go on record as
appreciating the fact that the war was not lost Ln the FMLN's 1981 "Final Offensive" and it is a lot easier
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bad, that for awhile, it seemed like the insurgents might win. The Salvadoran
government and the ESAF made so many mistakes that many of the trainers and
advisers in El Salvador today admit that if they had been Salvadorans, they would have
sided with the guerrillas. 169
Guidance and support did finally come down in the Woerner Report. Next came
the first cut at a broad-based NCP with Operation Bienestar. When it became clear that
the NCP could produce desired results, but the bureaucratic mechanism was bad, UPR
was the answer. UPR did many of the same good things, plus more psychological
operations, but since it was run by the military (with all of the civil-military stigmas that
a military-run program was bound to have in El Salvador) it was rejected by Duarte's
government. Finally, a solution was found in the MEA program. The idea behind the
MEA program was to encourage democratic government and provide opportunities and
growth at the local village-level. Each village held open town meetings. The people
nominated and voted for the infrastructure development projects that they wanted in
their own village and USAID's money went straight to the mayor. The mayor hired
local people to do the work and the townspeople oversaw the progress of each project.
As a result, people began to feel like they could make a difference in the quality of their
lives and felt vested in their homeland. MEA was a winner and it continues in El
Salvador today.
to speculate about should have—or could have—been done, given the benefit of hindsight and an
unavoidably over-simplistic view of the problem.
169 The ESAF abused the people that could either support them—or turn against them and join the
insurgents. They did not learn until very late how valuable would become the moral high ground. In the
end, they lost the very institution (and way of life) they had tried so hard to preserve.
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The senior leaders did not develop the program; it was bottom-fed from USAID
and MILGP workers in the field. Then the leaders did the right thing. They said—this
works; it is producing the results we need—this is the way we are going! But had the
leadership not thrown their support behind other programs that subsequently fizzled?
Yes they had, but the point is that they kept pointing the Country Team in the next best
direction until they (and the Salvadorans) found something that worked. Colonel John
Waghelstein, eleven years after he served as the USMILGP Commander in El Salvador,
offered a different perspective about America's role in the counterinsurgency effort:
I believe that Washington's greatest contribution to the Latin American
counter-insurgency era was not the brilliant tactical and operational
training and advice provided during that era, nor was it the millions in
military hardware. The case could be made that while training, advisory
and material assistance programmes were important, they were really the
entree that gave the opportunity to ask the right questions that, in turn,
helped the clients to select the correct responses. In short, get the
diagnosis done right first, then look for treatment options. 170
B. HYPOTHESIS #2
Trust, stakes, and shared experiences are important determinants ofeffective
interagency coordination.
This hypothesis proved to be mostly true. Trust emerged as the most critical
determinant of interagency coordination and shared experiences tended to build trust.
The stakes, however, did not seem to clearly lead to better interagency coordination.
The stakes had to be high enough to keep people interested, but then they seemed to
reach a point of diminishing returns. Coordination got better as the stakes were raised,
but it did not worsen when the stakes dropped. Improvements in cross-agency
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coordination were necessary for stronger unity, and coordination needed trust and shared
experiences. Most of the time it was not a matter of selfishness or stubbornness on the
part of one individual that ultimately encumbered coordination, rather it was a matter of
understanding why coordinating with the other made more sense than following the
normal routine. People needed to realize how they each contributed to the larger effort.
After coordination produced some better results, the tendency was to make the extra
effort, next time. After a while, extra effort could be drawn out because each individual
knew and trusted the other, and empathized with the other's predicament. Helping
someone outside the organization in such an obviously interrelated environment was
like investing in insurance
—
you hope you will never need it, but you are sure glad it is
there, if you do.
Individual trust became progressively better as the war wore on. Organizational
and national-level trust improved, but never reached a prominently high level. Trust
above the level of individuals appeared superficial and more skeptical. "Trust, but
verify" remained the rule. This meant constant USAID audits and figurative finger-
pointing at the higher levels. The further from "the action" representatives of each
organization found themselves, the higher their tendency for distrust. High-level
distrust translated into laborious policies that then rippled down through the
organizations and made coordination on the ground more difficult.
170
John D. Waghelstein, "Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counterinsurgency
Business," Small Wars and Insurgencies ,Vol. 5 (Winter 1994), pp. 360-378: 368.
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C. HYPOTHESIS #3
The resource constraints and irregular nature ofthe conflict required mutual
interagency support in order to achieve unity ofpurpose.
This third hypothesis also turned out to be partially true. Constrained resources,
like stakes, may have contributed to better mutual interagency support, but it is not clear
that resource constraints were a direct causal link. When resources were less
constrained during the middle of the war, mutual support still increased, as did unity of
effort. Then, when resources became more constrained towards the end of the war,
mutual interagency support stayed at the same "improved" level. The nature of the
conflict demanded interagency mutual support. The all-inclusive NCP could not be
accomplished by either organization alone. The MILGP needed USAID's money,
humanitarian and civilian inroads to the populace, and global appeal. USAID needed
the MILGP' s access to the countryside, its logistics capabilities, and the cloak of
security it could provide. Even ifUSAID had had its own fleet of helicopters and
security forces, the ESAF ran the country outside San Salvador, and those were the
areas USAID needed access to. Without the MILGP, USAID would have faced
resistance from the FMLN—and the ESAF.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
If nothing changes, and the US continues to conduct ad hoc business as usual,
the military will predictably be called upon to respond and restore order only to be
frustrated by ineffectual organizations and bureaucratic infighting on the homefront.
Realizing this now, the military should take the lead in organizing and preparing for
interagency operations. Throughout the course of this interagency study, certain themes
90
came to light. The ideas listed below should be considered preventative advice, policy
recommendations, or in some cases—imperatives. Like everything in El Salvador, they
are easier to say than they are to do.
1. Conduct Interagency Exercises
Operations in El Salvador, Panama, Haiti, and Somalia (to name only a recent
few); all were interagency efforts. It is not enough to practice joint operations;
interagency scenarios are more probable. Interagency exercises allow more realism by
exploring civilian (as well as military) courses of action, and provide the shared
experiences that develop trust and better understanding. Senior leaders and hands-on
operators could thus be exposed to the kinds of problems they are most likely to face.
It would be unfair to suggest that interagency exercises are not taking place
—
they are, but not to the extent that I believe is necessary. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) recently incorporated interagency participants into Exercise BLUE
ADVANCE (a disaster relief scenario), Fuerzas Evacuation (a noncombatant
evacuation scenario), and Fuerzas Unidas (a counter-drug scenario). Steps are being
taken (and they seem to be going in the right direction), but we need more elsewhere,
and in deliberate ways. As David Mitchell, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy matters explained: "There is no central clearing house for interagency
training."
171
There are interagency conferences being sponsored by USAID that focus
on post-conflict operations, some that address humanitarian operations, and others that
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Civilian David Miller is the Assistant for Civil Affairs Policy in the Pentagon. He added: "Most
(interagency) exercises are decentralized, and the planners invite those that they feel they want. Often,
though, the interagency representatives are . . . token—e.g. one person to represent the NGO community.
Also, the people that participate in exercises are not necessarily those that would participate in a later
operation."
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deal with police agencies involved in peace operations. But so far there has been no
initiative to exercise hypothetical country teams in the back woods of North Carolina,
Louisiana, or Northwest Florida where special operators train for their real-world
missions. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has the resources to conduct
interagency exercises at least at the tactical, village level. There are several other civic
action/MOOTW exercise scenarios that could easily be expanded to incorporate non-
military players. It is just a matter of deciding it is the prudent thing to do, and I think it
is.
2. Invest in People
Do not just say it—do it! The greatest weapon a special operator wields is his,
or her, brain. Learning to think about difficult problems takes education, training, and
practice. Regional expertise is more than being able to speak a language. Cross-cultural
communications come from practice. Our people have to get to know the people they
might be required to advise, persuade, train, or fight with (in every corner of the globe),
including at home. The people involved in interagency efforts must get to know the
people in the other agencies, develop trust, and make deals that outweigh the larger
hindrances. The "hooks" need to be placed where they can do our nation, and our allies,
the most good. We need to go beyond the areas where vital interests are at stake and
develop relationships wherever we can. The world is smaller now then ever before and
boundaries are fading. This is the skill required of modern "warrior-diplomats" who
make up the special operations forces. It is invaluable. It is a bargain, but it is not
cheap.
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3. Educate the Leaders
Ambassadors, commanders, directors, or policy makers: every one of these
senior leaders can make a big difference in how the US government conveys, translates,
or implements policy. They need to appreciate (not just pay lip service to) how civilian
and military agencies will act upon their guidance. Today, fewer civilian leaders have
military experience so they may be more apt to view the military (especially special
operators) as reckless, trigger-happy, or otherwise incapable of handling matters that
require diplomacy and tact. Deliberate efforts must be made to educate, demonstrate,
and otherwise acquaint these key senior leaders to the military in order to develop trust.
Cultivating trust at all levels is bound to improve interagency operations and therefore
bolsters US national interests.
4. Develop Interagency Organizations
This is perhaps the easiest to say, hardest to do, and least likely to happen
anytime soon. That said, interagency structures and procedures are imperatives. The
"joint" train has already left the station. It will take years before the military begins to
practice what it has preached, and now recorded, as joint doctrine. Joint Pub 1 says:
"When the United States undertakes military operations, the U.S. Armed Forces are
only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of
national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of
effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of
172 Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict
characterizes SOF as "warrior diplomats."
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Federal departments and agencies." True jointness has yet to arrive and begin to re-
color unified organizations and operations. Good—because "purple" is no longer the
color in vogue. Joint operations are simple in comparison to the many possible
disparate interagency combinations that are involved in all manner of contemporary
civil-military operations. Civilians and the military will have to work side-by-side,
more and more, in order to accomplish US national objectives. Turf delineation will
become (has become) less certain. The equation is further complicated when the
context is global and other countries act in accordance with their own versions of
suitable civil-military relations. Until the concept of optimizing has been redefined to
include postwar reconciliation concerns earlier in the process, it is safe to say that
interagency operations will continue to be sub-optimized by dated beliefs about
democratic civil-military relations. Maybe "gold" is the new color for the paradigm
which communicates the modern, interagency approach to complex problems.
Interagency operations are here to stay and the organizations need to support them. If
the Country Team can make it happen at the host country level, then there needs to be
empowered Country Team-type organizations at the regional and national levels. The
empowerment of interagency entities—the "crabgrass" of bureaucracy—is essential for
implementing national solutions to complicated problems. Without institutionalizing
interagency emphasis, too much unity of effort will be sacrificed until the workarounds
get in place. But if change is bad for organizations, then change is really bad for US
bureaucracies. Organizations need to change if they are to support interagency
operations that, in many cases, are extremely time-critical: counter-terrorism (CT)
173
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub I, Joint Warfare ofthe U.S. Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.
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responses, for example. Today CT responses are the result of a convoluted ad hoc
process in which success relies upon innate human reactions, given their appreciation of
the urgency of terrorist crises, to squelch interagency squabbles and get the job done
fast. Ad hoc processes. . . is that what we really want, or rather what we have settled for
instead of making hard decisions and real changes?
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